Error Preservation for MSA-Deviation Complaints | In the Interest of D.C.C. and R.C.C. (2026)

In the Interest of D.C.C. and R.C.C., Children, 05-25-00657-CV, August 06, 2026.

On appeal from 382nd Judicial District Court, Rockwall County, Texas

Synopsis

A party who contends that a final divorce decree improperly deviates from a binding mediated settlement agreement must preserve that complaint in the trial court. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that ordinary preservation rules under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 still apply, even where Family Code sections 6.602 and 153.0071 make a qualifying MSA binding and entitle the parties to judgment on its terms.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters directly to Texas divorce and SAPCR practice because MSA-enforcement fights often arise not at mediation, but at prove-up, decree drafting, and post-judgment cleanup. The case is a strong reminder that a binding MSA is not self-executing for appellate purposes: if the decree adds terms, alters support, reallocates property obligations, or otherwise departs from the mediated deal, family-law counsel must make a clear record in the trial court or risk waiver on appeal.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The parties mediated their divorce and executed an MSA in March 2025. As relevant here, the MSA provided that Mother would receive and disburse child support for the children, and that each parent would pay one-half of daycare costs, with the parents agreeing to revisit the arrangement once each child started school. Father contended, without dispute from Mother, that the MSA did not require periodic monthly child-support payments and instead obligated him only to pay half of daycare.

Father then moved for entry of a final decree and attached a proposed decree that tracked that understanding. Its child-support section referenced only each parent’s obligation to pay half of daycare directly to the provider, with no monthly guideline support obligation.

At the April 16, 2025 prove-up, however, the trial court indicated that monthly child support would be included. After going off the record, the court instructed counsel to obtain income documentation and to “put the standard language in there” with a withholding order if needed, adding that this was simply how the law was handled in Rockwall County. The record also suggested the court knew the mediated deal contemplated non-standard support; a docket-sheet notation referenced a prove-up “w/ some changes to C-Support provision.”

Mother later filed a motion for clarification regarding the MSA and child support, asserting Father was obligated to pay child support but disputing amount, duration, and calculation. Father responded by attaching the MSA and stating that the parties had agreed to split childcare expenses in lieu of child support, but he also acknowledged that, “[p]er the Court’s ruling,” guideline child support was being ordered. Critically, he did not object to that ruling. Instead, he argued only that the monthly amount should be $829.89.

After a later hearing, the trial court signed a final decree ordering Father to pay monthly support of $1,750, later stepping down to $1,400 when the older child aged out or became disqualified. Although the decree included language suggesting agreement, neither party signed it, and counsel signed only “as to form only.” Father later filed a post-judgment motion for clarification, but that motion addressed home-maintenance reimbursement and did not complain that the decree varied from the MSA.

Issues Decided

• Whether a complaint that a divorce decree impermissibly deviates from a mediated settlement agreement under Family Code sections 6.602 and 153.0071 must be preserved in the trial court to be reviewed on appeal.
• Whether Father preserved his complaint that the final decree improperly imposed monthly child support contrary to the MSA.

Rules Applied

The court applied familiar MSA-enforcement principles alongside equally familiar preservation doctrine.

• Family Code section 6.602 governs mediated settlement agreements in divorce cases.
• Family Code section 153.0071 governs mediated settlement agreements in suits affecting the parent-child relationship.
• A qualifying MSA is binding, and a party is entitled to judgment on its terms notwithstanding Rule 11 or another rule of law.
• A trial court lacks authority to enter a judgment that varies from the terms of a qualifying MSA.
• A judgment fails to strictly comply with an MSA when it adds terms, significantly alters original terms, or undermines the parties’ intent.
• But Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 still requires a timely request, motion, or objection to preserve a complaint for appellate review.
• In decree-variance cases, preservation ordinarily requires raising the complaint through a timely objection, a motion to modify/correct/reform the judgment, a motion for new trial, or a similar vehicle.

The court relied in particular on Dallas authority holding that MSA-to-decree variance complaints are subject to ordinary preservation rules, including In re M.L.R., No. 05-15-00647-CV, 2016 WL 5791530 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.), and In re S.G.E., No. 05-18-00577-CV, 2019 WL 967336 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). It also cited In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013), for the binding nature of qualifying MSAs.

Application

The court’s analysis was straightforward and practitioner-focused: whatever the substantive strength of Father’s MSA argument, he never preserved it.

The record showed that at the prove-up, when the court announced that standard monthly child support language would be inserted, Father did not object. That moment mattered. If counsel believed the court was about to render a decree inconsistent with a binding MSA, that was the time to say so expressly and obtain a ruling or refusal to rule.

The problem compounded in the subsequent briefing. When Mother sought clarification regarding support, Father did reference the MSA and noted that the parties had agreed to split childcare expenses in lieu of child support. But he did not ask the trial court to enforce the MSA as written, did not object that guideline support would violate sections 6.602 or 153.0071, and did not present the issue as an error-preservation matter. Instead, he pivoted to amount, arguing that if monthly support were ordered, it should be $829.89. From the appellate court’s perspective, that was acquiescence, not preservation.

The same pattern continued at the decree stage. The appellate record contained no indication that Father objected at the final hearing to inclusion of monthly support. To the contrary, the record suggested he submitted a proposed decree containing a monthly-support figure—again reflecting participation in recalculating support rather than insistence on enforcing the mediated bargain.

Finally, Father filed no motion to modify, correct, or reform the judgment, and no motion for new trial raising the MSA-deviation complaint. His only post-judgment filing addressed an unrelated reimbursement issue. With no timely trial-court request, objection, or post-judgment challenge targeting the variance between the MSA and the decree, Rule 33.1 barred appellate review.

Holding

The court held that a complaint that a final divorce decree deviates from a mediated settlement agreement must be preserved in the trial court. The binding nature of a qualifying MSA under Family Code sections 6.602 and 153.0071 does not displace ordinary appellate preservation requirements.

The court further held that Father failed to preserve his complaint because he did not object when the trial court announced that monthly support would be included, did not clearly seek enforcement of the MSA instead of recalculation of support, did not object at the final hearing on the decree, and did not file a post-judgment motion challenging the variance. The judgment was therefore affirmed.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, the immediate lesson is that MSA enforcement is won or lost in the record, not in the abstract. Counsel cannot assume that because the statute says a qualifying MSA is binding, an appellate court will reverse an inconsistent decree absent preservation. If the trial court signals it intends to alter support, possession terms, reimbursement obligations, debt allocation, or property division in a way that departs from the MSA, counsel must identify the variance with specificity and request entry of judgment strictly conforming to the MSA.

This is especially important in child-support provisions embedded in global divorce MSAs. Trial courts may scrutinize non-guideline arrangements closely, and counsel may be tempted to shift from an enforcement posture to a damage-control posture once the court indicates resistance. This case shows the danger of that move. Once counsel begins arguing only about the amount of substituted relief, rather than objecting that any substituted relief violates the MSA, the record may read as acquiescence.

The opinion also has implications beyond support. The same preservation logic can apply where the final decree alters possession exchange logistics, expands injunctive language, changes reimbursement mechanisms, inserts conditions not found in the MSA, or revises property-sale procedures. If the decree “adds terms, significantly alters the original terms, or undermines the intent of the parties,” preservation is still required.

Practically, counsel should treat decree review as a separate appellate event. Compare the proposed decree line-by-line against the MSA, object on the record to any deviation, tender a conforming decree, and, if necessary, follow with a motion to modify, correct, or reform the judgment. In many cases, a short, precise objection tied to sections 6.602 and 153.0071 and Rule 33.1 will preserve what an otherwise meritorious appeal could lose.

Checklists

Preserving an MSA-to-Decree Variance Complaint

• Confirm that the MSA satisfies the statutory requirements of Family Code sections 6.602 and/or 153.0071.
• Identify every decree provision that arguably adds to, omits from, or alters the MSA.
• State a clear, on-the-record objection that the proposed decree deviates from the binding MSA.
• Cite the controlling basis for enforcement: the qualifying MSA is binding and the party is entitled to judgment on its terms.
• Request a ruling from the trial court.
• If the court refuses to conform the decree, ensure the refusal is reflected in the reporter’s record, written filings, or both.

Handling the Prove-Up When the Court Signals a Different Result

• Do not rely on off-the-record discussions to preserve the issue.
• When the court announces an intent to use “standard” language inconsistent with the MSA, object immediately and specifically.
• Explain precisely how the proposed language conflicts with the MSA.
• Tender a proposed decree that strictly tracks the MSA.
• Avoid shifting exclusively into an alternative-amount argument unless you expressly preserve that the primary position is enforcement of the MSA as written.
• Ask the court to admit the MSA into the record if needed to anchor the objection.

Post-Judgment Preservation Steps

• Review the signed decree against the MSA immediately upon entry.
• File a motion to modify, correct, or reform the judgment if the decree varies from the MSA.
• Alternatively or additionally, file a motion for new trial raising the variance.
• Specify each conflicting paragraph and quote or attach the relevant MSA provisions.
• Request a hearing if necessary to obtain a ruling or a refusal to rule.
• Do not assume that a generic motion for clarification preserves an MSA-enforcement complaint.

Avoiding Acquiescence in an Altered Support Provision

• Do not argue only over the amount of support if your position is that no monthly support may be imposed under the MSA.
• If presenting an alternative amount in the event the court overrules your primary position, expressly label it as alternative relief.
• State that you do not waive your objection that the court must render judgment on the MSA.
• Avoid submitting a decree with altered substantive terms unless the record makes clear it is tendered subject to a preserved objection.
• Use “approved as to form only” carefully; it may help on consent issues, but it does not substitute for preservation.

Decree-Drafting Audit for Family Lawyers

• Compare child-support terms.
• Compare conservatorship rights and duties.
• Compare possession and access schedules.
• Compare geographic restrictions.
• Compare property division mechanics.
• Compare debt-allocation provisions.
• Compare reimbursement or equalization clauses.
• Compare sale/refinance deadlines and enforcement language.
• Compare tax provisions and dependency claims.
• Compare attorney’s fees, injunctive relief, and miscellaneous boilerplate that may alter substance.

Citation

In the Interest of D.C.C. and R.C.C., Children, No. 05-25-00657-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 6, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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