Family Code § 53.04 Does Not Require Service on Both Parents | In the Matter of A.F. and I.M.A.F. (2026)

In the Matter of A.F. and I.M.A.F. v. The State of Texas, 14-25-00772-CV, August 04, 2026.

On appeal from 315th District Court, Harris County, Texas

Synopsis

Texas Family Code § 53.04 does not require the State to serve both parents in a juvenile delinquency proceeding merely because both parents’ names and addresses are known. Service on one parent satisfies the statute’s petition and notice requirements, and the Fourteenth Court therefore affirmed the denial of the juveniles’ motions to dismiss.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a juvenile-delinquency case, its service analysis matters to Texas family lawyers because Family Code notice provisions frequently intersect with parent-status disputes, conservatorship structures, and parallel juvenile, SAPCR, and enforcement proceedings. For divorce and custody litigators, the opinion is a useful reminder that courts will closely parse singular versus plural statutory wording in the Family Code, and they may reject expansive notice arguments where the text does not expressly require service on “both” parents, “all” parents, or every known conservator—an interpretive approach that can affect jurisdictional objections, due-process arguments, and litigation strategy in cases involving absent parents, nonprimary conservators, or complicated family structures.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The State filed multiple original indeterminate petitions against A.F. and I.M.A.F. in Harris County juvenile court, alleging several delinquent acts, including unlawful carry of a handgun, evading arrest on foot, evading arrest by motor vehicle, and aggravated assault with bodily injury. In each matter, the State served the juveniles’ mother. It did not serve their father, even though the juveniles contended the State knew his name and address.

The juveniles moved to dismiss, arguing the State failed to comply with Texas Family Code § 53.04(d) and (e) because both parents were known and only one was served. The trial court denied the motions after briefing and hearings. The juveniles then stipulated true to the allegations under agreed dispositions while preserving a limited right to appeal the service issue.

On appeal, the sole dispute was statutory: whether § 53.04 requires service on both parents when both are known, or whether service on one parent is enough.

Issues Decided

• Whether Texas Family Code § 53.04(d)(3) requires the State to serve both parents in a juvenile delinquency proceeding when both parents’ names and residence addresses are known.
• Whether § 53.04(d)(4) applies where at least one parent’s residence is known and that parent resides in Texas.
• Whether the trial court properly denied the juveniles’ motions to dismiss based on failure to serve their father.

Rules Applied

The court treated the question as one of statutory construction and therefore reviewed the issue de novo.

The court relied on the following authorities and principles:

• Tex. Fam. Code § 53.04(d)(3), requiring the petition to state the names and residence addresses, if known, of the “parent, guardian, or custodian” of the child.
• Tex. Fam. Code § 53.04(d)(4), addressing substitute-relative information when the parent, guardian, or custodian does not reside in Texas, cannot be found in Texas, or the residence is unknown.
• The rule that courts give effect to the statute’s plain language unless the text is ambiguous.
• L.G.R. v. State, 724 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. 1987), for the general proposition that juvenile petition and notice requirements must be satisfied, though not for any holding that both parents must be served.
• Matter of D.M., 679 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied), as a case involving complete failure to name or serve either parent, not a one-parent-versus-two-parents service dispute.
• Mavoides v. State, No. 13-04-00079-CR, 2006 WL 1965814, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 13, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.), concluding § 53.04(d)(3) does not require both parents to be named.
• Tex. Fam. Code § 53.06(a)(2), the summons statute, which refers to the child’s “parent, guardian, or custodian.”
• Cases construing § 53.06 as permitting service on one parent:
• In re P.C., 858 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ)
• K.M.P. v. State, 701 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ)
• In Matter of C.P., No. 03-15-00276-CV, 2016 WL 4979223, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)

Application

The Fourteenth Court began where Texas appellate courts usually begin in service disputes framed as statutory questions: with the text. The juveniles argued that because § 53.04(d)(3) uses the plural terms “names” and “residence addresses,” the Legislature necessarily required the State to serve both parents whenever both parents are known. The court rejected that reading as textually overbroad.

In the court’s view, the more important words in the statute were not the plural nouns “names” and “addresses,” but the singular and disjunctive phrasing “parent, guardian, or custodian.” That wording contemplates service on one qualifying adult rather than mandating service on every possible adult in the category. The court emphasized that the statute does not say “both parents,” “all parents,” or “every known parent, guardian, or custodian.” Absent that kind of mandatory collective language, the court would not read a two-parent service requirement into the statute.

The court also found support in cases construing the related summons provision in § 53.06(a)(2). Because § 53.06 uses parallel phrasing—“the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian”—other appellate courts had already concluded that summons to one parent is sufficient. The Fourteenth Court considered those cases persuasive in interpreting § 53.04. The logic was straightforward: if the Legislature used materially similar language in adjacent juvenile-procedure provisions, similar language should receive a similar construction unless the text directs otherwise.

The juveniles’ authorities did not carry the point. L.G.R. established only that statutory petition and notice requirements matter; it did not decide whether both parents must be served. Matter of D.M. involved a more fundamental pleading and service defect because neither parent was named or served. That was not this case. Here, one parent was identified and served, so the narrow question was whether the statute required more. The court answered no.

As to § 53.04(d)(4), the court held that subsection simply was not triggered. That provision addresses situations in which the parent, guardian, or custodian does not reside in Texas, cannot be found in Texas, or the residence is unknown. Because the mother was known, located, and served, the statutory conditions for subsection (d)(4) were absent.

Holding

The court held that Texas Family Code § 53.04(d)(3) does not require service on both parents in a juvenile delinquency proceeding when both parents’ names and addresses are known. Service on one parent satisfies the statute because the provision refers to the child’s “parent, guardian, or custodian” in the singular and disjunctive, and the statute contains no affirmative command requiring service on both or all parents.

The court also held that § 53.04(d)(4) did not apply on these facts because that subsection is limited to circumstances in which the relevant parent, guardian, or custodian is out of state, cannot be found in the state, or has an unknown residence. Since the juveniles’ mother was known and served, there was no statutory violation under subsection (d)(4).

Based on those holdings, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss and affirmed the judgments.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, this case is less about juvenile practice in isolation and more about how Texas courts read Family Code notice provisions when parties attempt to convert statutory irregularities into dismissal arguments. The opinion reinforces three strategic lessons.

First, do not assume a court will infer a dual-parent notice requirement from plural nouns alone. If you are pressing a service-based challenge in a custody, enforcement, modification, or related juvenile matter, the statutory text must actually require notice to multiple persons. Where the Legislature uses singular and disjunctive phrasing—such as “parent, guardian, or custodian”—courts may read the statute as satisfied by notice to any one qualifying person unless other provisions compel broader service.

Second, if your litigation position depends on distinguishing between a complete failure of notice and an incomplete notice theory, frame that distinction carefully. The juveniles here were unable to leverage authorities involving no parent being named or served because those cases addressed materially different defects. In family litigation, that same distinction matters in disputes over notice to conservators, grandparents with access orders, possessory conservators, or parties in transferred and consolidated proceedings. A court may treat “no notice to anyone the statute requires” very differently from “notice to one of several arguably interested persons.”

Third, for practitioners handling overlapping juvenile and family-court matters, this opinion can influence strategic expectations around due-process arguments. The court did not treat service on one known parent as a due-process problem where the statute itself was satisfied. That should prompt caution before advancing broad constitutional rhetoric untethered from statutory text, especially when the client’s real complaint is that another parent was not included in the process despite one parent having received valid notice.

In practical divorce and SAPCR settings, the analogy is not that one-parent service is always enough; it is that the adequacy of notice turns on the exact statute, order, and party status in play. For example:

• In a modification or enforcement case, verify whether the absent person is actually a party entitled to citation or merely a nonparty parent with practical interest.
• In cases involving joint managing conservators, do not assume each conservator must receive identical notice unless the governing rule, order, or statute specifically says so.
• When building a dismissal or abatement argument, focus on express statutory commands rather than equitable instincts about fairness.
• When defending service, emphasize the Legislature’s actual wording and the absence of mandatory collective language.

Checklists

Evaluating a Statutory Notice Challenge

• Identify the exact Family Code provision governing notice or service.
• Parse whether the statute uses singular, plural, conjunctive, or disjunctive language.
• Check whether the statute expressly requires notice to “both,” “all,” or “each” listed persons.
• Distinguish between mandatory parties, permissive recipients, and persons with practical but not statutory interests.
• Determine whether the alleged defect is:
• total failure of notice,
• defective content in the pleading,
• service on the wrong person, or
• service on one but not all arguably interested persons.
• Research adjacent provisions using similar wording for interpretive guidance.

Preserving Error on Service and Notice Issues

• Raise the service defect early and in writing.
• Cite the exact statutory subsections allegedly violated.
• Explain why the defect is jurisdictional, procedural, or harmful under existing authority.
• Develop a record showing what names, addresses, and relationships were known to the opposing party.
• Obtain a ruling on the motion.
• If proceeding under a stipulation or settlement framework, expressly reserve the right to appeal the service issue where permitted.

Defending Against Dismissal Based on Partial Service

• Start with the text of the governing statute.
• Emphasize singular and disjunctive wording where present.
• Highlight the absence of language requiring notice to every known parent or conservator.
• Distinguish authorities involving complete failure to serve any required person.
• Use analogous statutes and cases construing materially similar language.
• Address fallback arguments under substitute-notice provisions and explain why they are not triggered by the facts.

Applying the Case in Divorce, Custody, and SAPCR Practice

• Confirm whether the person allegedly omitted from service is a named party to the case.
• Review prior orders to determine whether that person has a procedural status that independently requires notice.
• Avoid assuming that a biological parent’s existence automatically equates to statutory entitlement to service in every procedural setting.
• In blended or high-conflict family systems, document who was served and why that service complied with the governing rule.
• When attacking notice, tie the omission to a specific statutory command and a concrete litigation consequence.
• When defending notice, frame the issue as one of statutory compliance rather than abstract fairness.

Drafting and Record-Building for Parallel Juvenile and Family Proceedings

• Include complete parent, guardian, and custodian information in pleadings where required.
• Verify whether all known addresses are accurately stated, even if service on one person may suffice.
• Create a clean record of issuance, service, returns, and any known residence information.
• Anticipate appellate arguments by briefing both plain-language and policy positions.
• Where service on only one parent is used, be prepared to explain why the statute permits it.
• Coordinate positions across juvenile and family cases to avoid inconsistent arguments about party status or notice rights.

Citation

In the Matter of A.F. and I.M.A.F. v. The State of Texas, Nos. 14-25-00767-CV, 14-25-00772-CV, 14-25-00773-CV, 14-25-00779-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 4, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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