CROSSOVER: Dallas Court: Limitations Is Not a Sufficiency Element, Even in Child-Sex and Family-Violence Prosecutions

Koorasingh v. State, 05-25-01181-CR, August 17, 2026.

On appeal from 199th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas

Synopsis

The Dallas Court of Appeals held that limitations is not a legal-sufficiency element the State must prove unless the defense is actually in play under governing law. Even where the jury charge told jurors the offense must have occurred before indictment and not be barred by limitations, sufficiency was still measured by the hypothetically correct charge, not by an unnecessary charge add-on.

Relevance to Family Law

This is a criminal opinion, but the procedural lesson matters in Texas family litigation because family cases routinely turn on charge-like submissions, predicate findings, and preservation-driven sufficiency complaints. In SAPCRs, enforcement actions, protective-order proceedings, reimbursement claims, characterization disputes, and jury-tried conservatorship cases, lawyers often try to convert an unnecessary instruction, recital, or temporal allegation into an additional evidentiary burden on appeal. Koorasingh is a strong reminder that appellate sufficiency review tracks the legally required elements or findings, not surplus language that found its way into a submission. That principle can materially affect how family lawyers draft questions, object to broad-form submissions, preserve defenses, and frame no-evidence challenges tied to timing, predicate facts, or statutory prerequisites.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The appeal arose from four criminal convictions tried together in Collin County: three sexual-assault counts and one count for continuous violence against the family. The complainant, M.K., testified that appellant was her father and that sexual conduct began while she was in high school and continued for years. She also testified that after she tried to end the sexual relationship, appellant became physically violent toward her, including separate incidents involving kicking and striking her with objects.

The three sexual-assault indictments alleged offenses committed “on or about” November 23, 2020. The jury charges in those cases instructed that jurors need not find the offenses occurred on that exact date so long as they found the offenses occurred before April 17, 2025, the date of indictment, “and [were] not barred by the statute of limitations.” On appeal, the defendant argued the evidence was legally insufficient because there was no proof the offenses occurred on the pleaded date and no proof establishing the applicable limitations period or the prosecution’s timeliness.

That framing mattered because the appellate issue was not whether there was evidence of the sexual acts themselves, but whether the charge language had effectively inserted an additional sufficiency requirement. The Dallas court said no.

Issues Decided

• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the sexual-assault convictions when the State did not prove the offenses occurred on the exact “on or about” date alleged in the indictments.
• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient when the jury charge stated the offense had to occur before indictment and not be barred by limitations, but the record contained no evidence identifying the applicable limitations period.
• Whether limitations became part of the State’s legal-sufficiency burden merely because the jury charge referenced it.

Rules Applied

The court relied on the standard legal-sufficiency framework and on the distinction between actual offense elements and unnecessary jury-charge language.

• Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and its Texas applications, evidence is legally sufficient if any rational juror could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Sufficiency is measured against the hypothetically correct jury charge, not against every word that appears in the actual charge. See Turley v. State, 691 S.W.3d 612, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).
• A charge that unnecessarily adds a made-up or extra element does not increase the State’s burden for legal-sufficiency review. See Ramjattansingh v. State, 548 S.W.3d 540, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
• “On or about” pleading does not require proof of the exact indictment date so long as the evidence shows the offense occurred before presentment of the indictment and within any legally material temporal limits. See Sanchez v. State, 400 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
• Limitations is an affirmative defense that is waived if not asserted. See Proctor v. State, 967 S.W.2d 840, 844–45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
• The State need not prove the prosecution is timely unless there is some evidence supporting the defense and the defendant requests a limitations instruction. See Tita v. State, 267 S.W.3d 33, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Proctor, 967 S.W.2d at 845.
• For sexual assault of a child under Penal Code section 22.011(a)(2), there is no limitations bar. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 12.01(1)(B).
• The charged sexual-assault statute was Tex. Penal Code § 22.011.

Application

The Dallas court first disposed of the easy point: the State did not have to prove the assaults occurred on November 23, 2020, simply because the indictments used that date. The charges themselves told jurors they were not bound to that exact date, and Texas law has long treated “on or about” allegations as sufficient if the proof places the offense before indictment and within any legally material time limitation. M.K.’s testimony placed the sexual conduct roughly between 2019 and 2023, which was enough to support a finding that the charged conduct predated the April 2025 indictments.

The harder issue was the limitations language embedded in the jury charge. The court acknowledged that the charge could be read to require a jury finding that the prosecution was not barred by limitations. It also acknowledged there was no evidence in the record telling the jury what the applicable limitations period was. But that did not create a sufficiency defect, because limitations was not an element of the offense. Instead, it was an affirmative defense, and one that mattered only if supported by evidence and properly requested. Since the offenses at issue carried no limitations period under article 12.01(1)(B), and no limitations instruction had been requested as a real defensive issue, timeliness was not part of the hypothetically correct charge.

That is the doctrinal center of the opinion. The court refused to let surplus jury language redefine the substantive proof burden on appeal. In other words, the actual charge may have said more than the law required, but legal sufficiency still rose or fell on the essential statutory elements, not on gratuitous language.

Holding

The court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the sexual-assault convictions even though the State did not prove the offenses occurred on the exact date alleged in the indictments. Because the indictments alleged the offenses occurred “on or about” November 23, 2020, and the complainant’s testimony placed the offenses before the April 2025 indictments, the temporal proof was adequate.

The court further held that the absence of evidence about the statute of limitations did not defeat legal sufficiency. Limitations was not an element of sexual assault under the charged statute, and the State had no burden to prove the prosecution was timely simply because the jury charge referenced limitations. Sufficiency review remained anchored to the hypothetically correct jury charge, which excluded that unnecessary add-on.

The judgments were affirmed.

Practical Application

For Texas family litigators, the opinion is most useful as a briefing and preservation case. Its central lesson is that an appellate sufficiency challenge should focus on legally required findings, not on stray or surplus language in a jury question, instruction, temporary-order recital, or enforcement submission. In family cases, this comes up when a party argues that because a jury question included extra wording about timing, notice, best-interest factors, or statutory conditions, the opposing party had to prove each one as a matter of evidentiary sufficiency. Koorasingh is a useful analog when the issue is whether the submission merely over-describes the law or actually states a required predicate.

This also matters in enforcement litigation. Parties often attack enforcement orders by arguing the movant failed to prove a date range, arrearage component, notice predicate, or violation sequence exactly as worded in the pleading or order. The right appellate question is whether the complained-of fact is truly an element or predicate required by the governing statute or rule, or merely descriptive surplusage.

In custody and protective-order work, timing allegations can become especially important. Allegations that conduct occurred “on or about” a certain date, or during a broad period, do not necessarily create a duty to prove an exact date unless timing is itself legally material. Where a statutory scheme requires proof within a specific time window, the issue is different. But where timing language is merely descriptive, Koorasingh supports resisting efforts to manufacture a no-evidence point out of an inexact date.

For trial lawyers, the decision is also a reminder to be deliberate about requested instructions. If a party wants a defense, limitation, or other avoidance theory to matter, it generally must be raised by evidence and properly submitted. Conversely, if the other side manages to insert unnecessary language into a charge or question, that does not automatically expand the evidentiary burden on appeal. The record still needs to be framed around the real statutory requirements.

Checklists

Evaluating Whether a Timing Argument Is Real or Cosmetic

• Identify the governing statute or rule and isolate the actual required elements or predicate findings.
• Determine whether the disputed date or time range is legally material or merely descriptive.
• Check whether the pleading uses “on or about” language or a fixed date allegation.
• Ask whether the date affects jurisdiction, limitations, retroactivity, notice, or another true legal prerequisite.
• Distinguish between proof needed to obtain relief and surplus language included in a question, instruction, or recital.

Preserving a Defense That Requires Submission

• Confirm the defense is recognized as an affirmative defense, avoidance, or statutory exception.
• Develop at least some evidence supporting the defense.
• Request a written instruction or question tailored to the actual law.
• Object to omission of the defensive submission on the record.
• Secure a ruling or refusal sufficient to preserve appellate review.

Drafting Jury Questions and Instructions in Family Cases

• Avoid adding explanatory language that can create later confusion about what must be proved.
• Track statutory language closely when drafting predicate findings.
• Separate true elements from illustrative or descriptive facts.
• Use time references only when timing is substantively relevant.
• Review broad-form submissions for unnecessary factual embellishments that could invite avoidable appellate issues.

Responding to No-Evidence and Legal-Sufficiency Complaints

• Frame the response around the hypothetically correct submission, not the opponent’s preferred wording.
• Cite authority distinguishing actual elements from surplus jury-charge language.
• Explain why the challenged fact is not a statutory predicate.
• If timing is at issue, tie the proof to the legally relevant period rather than the pleaded date alone.
• Where applicable, argue waiver if the opponent failed to plead, prove, or request submission of an affirmative defense.

Using Koorasingh in Family-Law Appeals

• Use the case when the opposing party argues an unnecessary instruction increased your proof burden.
• Use it to resist date-specific sufficiency arguments when the law does not require exact-date proof.
• Use it to distinguish between legal sufficiency and charge error.
• Pair it with preservation authorities when the omitted or disputed issue is defensive in nature.
• Be careful not to overread it: if a family statute makes timing or a predicate fact essential, Koorasingh will not eliminate that burden.

Citation

Koorasingh v. State, Nos. 05-25-01180-CR, 05-25-01181-CR, 05-25-01182-CR, 05-25-01183-CR, memorandum opinion (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 17, 2026, affirmed).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

Family Law Crossover

The procedural mechanism this ruling reinforces is the hypothetically-correct-charge framework for legal-sufficiency review, coupled with the rule that an affirmative defense does not become part of the opponent’s proof burden unless it is legally applicable, supported by evidence, and properly submitted. In a Texas family case, that same reasoning can arise when a party argues that extra language in a jury submission, temporary order, enforcement pleading, or final decree transformed a nonessential fact into a required evidentiary element. The appellate inquiry should remain focused on the statutory predicates actually required for the relief awarded. Thus, in a conservatorship jury trial, an enforcement proceeding, a reimbursement dispute, or a marital-property characterization fight, Koorasingh provides a useful procedural analogy: surplus wording does not itself rewrite the elements of proof, and defensive theories must be properly raised and submitted before they alter the decisional framework.

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