CROSSOVER: Dallas Court Upholds Continuous Family Violence and Child Sexual Assault Convictions; Limitations Need Not Be Proved as an Evidentiary Fact

Koorasingh v. State, 05-25-01182-CR, August 17, 2026.

On appeal from 199th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas

Synopsis

The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the State did not have to offer separate proof that the sexual-assault prosecutions were timely where limitations was not actually a fact issue and, for the charged child-sexual-assault offenses, no limitations period applied. The court also reaffirmed the standard “on or about” rule: a conviction stands if the proof shows the offense occurred before indictment and within any applicable limitations period, even if the State does not prove the exact date alleged.

Relevance to Family Law

For Texas family law litigators, this is a useful crossover decision on date pleading, evidentiary sufficiency, and the difference between true merits elements and defensive matters. In SAPCRs, divorce cases involving family violence, and post-judgment enforcement or modification proceedings, lawyers routinely litigate acts described with approximate dates, especially where abuse allegations surface after a delay or where a child cannot anchor events to a calendar date. Koorasingh reinforces that, absent a statute or pleaded defense making timing an actual fact issue, not every temporal reference in a pleading or instruction becomes an evidentiary element. That matters in custody restrictions, protective-order practice, and fault-based divorce litigation, where opponents often try to recast imprecise timing as legal insufficiency rather than a credibility dispute.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The appeal arose from four criminal convictions tried together: three sexual-assault counts and one count for continuous violence against the family. The complainant, M.K., testified that the defendant—her father—engaged in repeated sexual conduct with her beginning when she was in ninth or tenth grade and continuing for years. Her testimony described repeated oral sexual contact in both directions and one occasion when his penis contacted her vagina during an attempted penetration. She also testified that when she later tried to stop the sexual relationship, the conduct shifted into physical violence, including kicking her and striking her with objects on different occasions.

The sexual-assault indictments alleged offenses committed “on or about” November 23, 2020. The jury charge told jurors they were not required to find the offenses occurred on that exact date so long as the offenses occurred before April 17, 2025, the indictment date, and were not barred by limitations. On appeal, the defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because the State did not prove the assaults happened on the alleged date and did not separately prove the applicable statute of limitations.

Issues Decided

• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the sexual-assault convictions when the State did not prove the exact “on or about” date alleged in the indictments.
• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient when the jury charge referenced that the offenses must not be barred by limitations, but the State offered no separate proof of the limitations period.
• More broadly, whether the State must prove in its case-in-chief that a prosecution is timely absent a limitations defense or evidence raising limitations as a fact issue.

Rules Applied

The court relied on familiar sufficiency and charge principles from Texas criminal law:

• Legal sufficiency is measured against a hypothetically correct jury charge, not against every extra phrase that may appear in the actual charge. Turley v. State, 691 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Ramjattansingh v. State, 548 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
• When an indictment alleges an offense occurred “on or about” a certain date, the State is generally not required to prove the exact date alleged, so long as the date proved is before presentment of the indictment and within any applicable limitations period. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.02(6); Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Sanchez v. State, 400 S.W.3d 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
• Statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that is waived if not asserted. The State need not prove timeliness unless limitations is raised by the evidence and properly submitted. Proctor v. State, 967 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Tita v. State, 267 S.W.3d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
• For sexual assault of a child under Penal Code section 22.011(a)(2), there is no statute of limitations. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 12.01(1)(B).

Application

The court treated the defendant’s sufficiency argument as attacking two different propositions: first, that the State failed to prove the exact date alleged; second, that the State failed to prove timeliness because the charge mentioned limitations. The first argument failed quickly. Because the indictments alleged the offenses occurred “on or about” November 23, 2020, the State was not required to prove that precise date. M.K.’s testimony placed the conduct in an overall period running roughly from 2019 to 2023, which comfortably preceded the April 2025 indictments. That was enough.

The more interesting point was the charge’s reference to limitations. The court acknowledged that the instruction could be read to require a finding that the offenses were not time-barred. But that did not transform limitations into an evidentiary element for sufficiency review. Applying the hypothetically correct jury charge framework, the court stripped away the unnecessary addition. Because limitations is an affirmative defense, and because these child-sexual-assault offenses carried no limitations period in the first place, the State had no burden to present independent evidence establishing timeliness. Nor had the defendant requested a limitations instruction supported by evidence. So the absence of proof about limitations did not create a legal-sufficiency problem.

Holding

The court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the three sexual-assault convictions even though the State did not prove the assaults occurred on the exact date alleged in the indictments. In an “on or about” case, proof of another date will suffice if it is before indictment and within any applicable limitations period.

The court also held that the State was not required to prove in its case-in-chief that the prosecutions were not barred by limitations. Limitations is an affirmative defense, not an element, and it becomes part of the State’s burden only if the evidence raises it and the law makes it material to submission. Because the charged child-sexual-assault offenses had no limitations period, and no limitations defense was properly in play, the lack of separate limitations proof did not undermine the convictions.

Practical Application

Family lawyers should read Koorasingh less for its criminal facts than for its procedural discipline. The case is a reminder to separate three concepts that too often get blurred in family litigation: pleaded date ranges, evidentiary proof of when events occurred, and whether timing is legally material. In custody trials, for example, allegations of family violence, sexual abuse, coercive control, or neglect are often described by school year, season, relationship phase, or residence rather than by exact date. If the governing statute does not make a date-specific showing indispensable, the fight is usually about credibility and weight—not legal sufficiency merely because the witness cannot tie the event to a single day.

The opinion is also useful where a family case imports quasi-defensive timing concepts. Think enforcement limitations, laches arguments in equity, or attacks on stale allegations in modification and restriction litigation. Koorasingh suggests a strategic framing point: unless timing is made material by statute, pleading, or a properly raised defense, practitioners should resist efforts to convert it into an unpled merits element. By the same token, if timing truly matters in your family case, do not assume a stray reference in a proposed order or charge-equivalent submission will carry the issue. You must develop the record, identify the governing timing rule, and make it an actual issue for decision.

Family Law Crossover

The procedural rule established by Koorasingh is that legal-sufficiency review is measured against the hypothetically correct charge or required elements, not against every unnecessary temporal qualifier included in the actual submission. Relatedly, a limitations-type issue does not become part of the proponent’s evidentiary burden unless the governing law makes it an element or the issue is properly raised as a defense. In a Texas family law matter, that can arise when a party alleges family violence, abuse, or endangerment using approximate dates, or when the opposing side argues that the absence of exact calendar proof defeats relief. It can also arise in enforcement or modification proceedings where a party tries to turn a timing objection into a merits-element challenge without first tying that objection to the applicable statute, rule, or preserved defense. The case is therefore a useful reminder to identify whether timing is truly an element, a defensive issue, or merely part of the factual narrative.

Checklists

Preserve Timing Issues as Actual Issues

• Identify whether timing is an element of the claim, a statutory prerequisite, or an affirmative defense.
• Cite the specific statute or rule that makes timing material.
• Plead the timing defense expressly where required.
• Request a submission that accurately states the law rather than relying on generalized “not barred” language.
• Make sure the appellate record shows how the timing issue was raised and why it matters.

Use “On or About” Proof Effectively in Family Cases

• Frame witness testimony by reference to school year, holidays, residences, medical events, or other anchors when exact dates are unavailable.
• Tie approximate dates to objective documents where possible.
• Emphasize that imprecision in date recall usually goes to weight and credibility unless the statute requires exactness.
• Anticipate and rebut arguments that a nonessential date variance creates legal insufficiency.
• Distinguish between a fatal variance and ordinary uncertainty in witness recollection.

Build the Record When Abuse Allegations Span Time

• Organize incidents chronologically even if exact dates are uncertain.
• Use records from schools, counselors, CPS, law enforcement, medical providers, and photographs to narrow date ranges.
• Clarify whether multiple incidents occurred on separate occasions when statutory thresholds matter.
• Elicit testimony linking events to developmental stages, grades, moves, or hospitalizations.
• Confirm whether the requested relief depends on one incident, a pattern, or a course of conduct.

Avoid the Non-Prevailing Party’s Problem

• Do not argue legal insufficiency based on a timing theory without first showing timing is part of the required proof.
• Do not assume an extra phrase in a charge or order increases the other side’s substantive burden on appeal.
• If limitations or timeliness matters, request a legally correct instruction or finding and support it with evidence.
• Research whether the underlying cause of action or offense has no limitations period or a modified one.
• Separate evidentiary complaints, charge complaints, and sufficiency complaints; do not collapse them into one undifferentiated argument.

Draft Better Family-Law Pleadings and Proposed Findings

• Use “on or about” language when exact dates are uncertain but the event timing remains material.
• Avoid unnecessary temporal restrictions in proposed findings or trial briefs.
• If a date range matters, state why it matters under the governing legal standard.
• Draft findings that focus on required facts rather than surplus language.
• Review final orders and requested findings for accidental additions to the burden of proof.

Citation

Koorasingh v. State, Nos. 05-25-01180-CR, 05-25-01181-CR, 05-25-01182-CR, 05-25-01183-CR, memorandum opinion, affirmed, Opinion Filed August 17, 2026 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 17, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

~~9012f7a1-b9cd-4f96-aec6-9da154d2e70a~~