Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc Cannot Correct Judicial Error | In re D.L.B. (2026)

In the Interest of D.L.B., D.L.B., and D.L.B., Minor Children, 04-25-00097-CV, August 19, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law, Val Verde County, Texas

Synopsis

After plenary power expires, a Texas trial court may use a judgment nunc pro tunc only to correct a clerical error, not to revise the substance of the judgment actually rendered. In In re D.L.B., the Fourth Court held that where the signed final order was the only evidence of rendition, deleting a sentence from that order—even one inconsistent with the parties’ mediated settlement agreement—was a correction of judicial error, making the nunc pro tunc judgment void.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters immediately in SAPCR modifications, divorces, and property cases because family-law practitioners often assume a mediated settlement agreement, Rule 11 agreement, oral pronouncement, or appellate mandate can be used later to “clean up” a signed final order. In re D.L.B. is a reminder that, once plenary power lapses, the critical question is not what the trial court should have signed or intended to sign, but what it actually rendered. If the only competent evidence of rendition is the signed order itself, a later substantive correction is judicial, not clerical, and nunc pro tunc relief is unavailable. That has obvious consequences for MSA enforcement, decree review, post-judgment cleanup, and preservation strategy in custody, support, and property litigation.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The dispute arose from a parent-child relationship case involving three minor children. The parties executed a mediated settlement agreement in April 2023. As relevant here, the MSA required the father to reimburse the mother, beginning July 1, 2023, for the children’s medical, dental, and vision insurance premiums she paid through her employer, with reimbursement to be made as additional child support through the Office of the Attorney General.

The trial court initially declined to enter judgment on the MSA, prompting mandamus relief from the Fourth Court of Appeals. The appellate court directed the trial court to enter an order or judgment in accordance with the parties’ MSA. The trial court later signed a February 16, 2024 modification order. That order included the father’s $489 monthly medical-support obligation, but it also included an additional sentence requiring the mother to provide written documentation of the insurance premiums before July 1, 2023, failing which she would be solely responsible for the cost of the children’s health, dental, and vision insurance.

Months later, after plenary power had expired, the mother moved for judgment nunc pro tunc, contending the “solely responsible” sentence was not contained in the MSA and should be deleted. The trial court granted that request and signed a nunc pro tunc order removing the sentence. The father challenged that order, arguing the change was substantive and therefore beyond the court’s power after plenary jurisdiction ended.

Issues Decided

• Whether Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 316 and 329b(f) permitted the trial court, after plenary power expired, to delete a substantive sentence from the final order by judgment nunc pro tunc.
• Whether removal of a sentence that did not conform to the parties’ mediated settlement agreement constituted correction of a clerical error or an impermissible correction of judicial error.
• Whether the existence of an MSA, a prior mandamus directive, or the trial court’s later statement that the order should match the MSA supplied evidence that the judgment actually rendered differed from the signed final order.

Rules Applied

The court applied the familiar distinction between clerical and judicial error under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 316 and 329b(f). After plenary power expires, a trial court retains authority only to correct clerical errors by nunc pro tunc; it cannot revise judicial errors.

Key authorities included:

• Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1986), for the rule that the inquiry focuses on the judgment actually rendered, not the judgment the court intended, could have rendered, or should have rendered.
• Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. 2013), confirming that nunc pro tunc relief is limited to clerical corrections after plenary power expires.
• Am.’s Favorite Chicken Co. v. Galvan, 897 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied), for the proposition that when the signed judgment is the only evidence of rendition, later substantive revision is judicial error as a matter of law.
• S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1995), defining rendition as an official announcement of the court’s decision, either orally in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk.
• Diaz v. Diaz, No. 04-19-00767-CV, 2020 WL 6597536 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 12, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.), addressing standard of review and the voidness of a nunc pro tunc judgment that corrects judicial error.
• TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.0071(d) and In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013), recognizing the statutory entitlement to judgment on a qualifying MSA, though that principle did not alter the nunc pro tunc analysis.

Application

The Fourth Court treated the case as turning on a single controlling question: what judgment did the trial court actually render? That framing did the work. The mother’s argument had intuitive force because the deleted sentence did not appear in the MSA, the trial court had previously been ordered by mandamus to enter judgment in accordance with the MSA, and the February 2024 order itself recited that it was intended to effectuate the MSA’s terms. But the court held those points showed, at most, what the trial court intended to render or what it should have rendered. They did not prove that the court had actually rendered some earlier different judgment.

The record was fatal to nunc pro tunc relief because it contained no competent evidence of a rendition preceding the February 16, 2024 signed order. There was no oral pronouncement, no docket entry announcing decision, no written memorandum filed with the clerk, and no testimony establishing that the court had previously rendered a different judgment. In that evidentiary vacuum, the signed order itself constituted the rendition.

Once that premise was established, the rest followed quickly. The “solely responsible” sentence was part of the judgment actually rendered, even if it deviated from the MSA and even if it was inserted through drafting error. Under Galvan, mistakes embedded in the judgment signed by the court are nonetheless judicial if the signed document is the only evidence of rendition. The trial court’s later statements at the nunc pro tunc hearing—that the order had to correspond with the MSA and that it would sign an order that coincided exactly with the MSA—did not help. Those statements were retrospective expressions of what the court believed should have happened, not evidence that it had already rendered a different judgment months earlier.

The court also rejected any suggestion that the ministerial nature of the trial court’s duty under the prior mandamus directive changed the analysis. Even a court acting under a mandate can commit judicial error in the judgment it renders, and nunc pro tunc cannot be used after plenary expiration to replace the judgment rendered with the judgment the court was supposed to render.

Holding

The court held that, after plenary power expires, Rules 316 and 329b(f) authorize a judgment nunc pro tunc only to correct a clerical error, meaning a discrepancy between the judgment actually rendered and the judgment entered of record. Because the record contained no evidence of an earlier rendition different from the February 16, 2024 signed order, that signed order was the judgment rendered.

The court further held that deleting the “solely responsible” sentence was a substantive change to the judgment rendered and therefore a correction of judicial error, not clerical error. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make that change by nunc pro tunc after plenary power had expired, rendering the nunc pro tunc order void.

The Fourth Court vacated the judgment nunc pro tunc and reinstated the February 16, 2024 order.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, this case is a sharp warning about the false comfort of the phrase “it’s just a nunc pro tunc.” In post-decree practice, lawyers frequently discover that a decree, modification order, QDRO-related order, support order, or SAPCR judgment contains language that does not track the MSA, oral ruling, or appellate mandate. In re D.L.B. teaches that the viability of a post-plenary fix depends less on the obviousness of the mistake than on the evidentiary record showing that the court actually rendered something different.

In divorce cases, this will matter when a decree contains an asset description, reimbursement provision, debt-allocation term, or injunction not contained in the Rule 11 or MSA. In SAPCR cases, it will matter when possession schedules, geographic restrictions, medical-support provisions, or exchange logistics in the signed order differ from the agreement read into the record. In enforcement proceedings, it will matter when a practitioner tries to characterize a substantive revision as a clerical cleanup. If there is no earlier oral pronouncement, written memorandum, or other competent proof of a different rendition, the signed order will likely control.

The practical lesson is front-end rigor and immediate post-judgment triage. Family lawyers should build a rendition record before signing, preserve oral pronouncements where possible, circulate redlines tied to the MSA, and move quickly within plenary deadlines if the signed order contains substantive variance. Once plenary power expires, even a plainly nonconforming provision may become effectively unfixable through nunc pro tunc.

A few strategic implications follow:

• If you represent the party seeking conformity to an MSA, do not rely on the MSA alone as proof of clerical error. You need evidence that the court actually rendered judgment in those terms before signing the conflicting order.
• If the court orally approves or pronounces terms on the record, obtain a reporter’s record and preserve that pronouncement as the anchor for later clerical-error arguments.
• If a proposed decree is inconsistent with the MSA, address it before signature if possible; if not, use motions while plenary power remains intact.
• If you represent the party benefiting from the signed language, In re D.L.B. gives you a strong jurisdictional defense to late “cleanup” efforts styled as nunc pro tunc motions.

Checklists

Pre-Signature MSA-to-Order Review

• Compare every operative term in the proposed final order against the MSA line by line.
• Flag any additional conditions, deadlines, enforcement triggers, or forfeiture provisions not expressly contained in the MSA.
• Confirm whether any “housekeeping” language materially alters payment obligations, possession, support, or property allocation.
• Circulate a redline showing every variance from the MSA.
• State objections on the record before the order is signed.
• If the order is styled “agreed,” make sure signatures actually support that characterization.

Create a Rendition Record

• Ask the court to orally pronounce approval of the agreement or the material terms in open court.
• Ensure a court reporter is present for the rendition hearing.
• Request a docket entry or written memorandum if the court announces a decision before the order is signed.
• File proposed orders promptly after oral rendition so the record reflects what was rendered.
• Preserve transcripts, correspondence, and filings that tie the signed judgment to a prior pronouncement.

Post-Signature Error Response During Plenary Power

• Calendar plenary deadlines immediately upon signing.
• Review the signed order the same day it is entered.
• If a substantive variance exists, file a motion to modify, correct, reform, or for new trial before plenary power expires.
• Avoid assuming the issue can be fixed later by nunc pro tunc.
• Request a hearing while the court still has full jurisdiction to alter the judgment.

Evaluating Whether Nunc Pro Tunc Is Available

• Identify the exact alleged error.
• Ask whether there is evidence the court actually rendered a different judgment earlier.
• Distinguish between a discrepancy in entry of record and a mistake in judicial decision-making.
• Determine whether the proposed change alters substantive rights or obligations.
• Treat changes to support, possession, property division, reimbursement, or conditions precedent as likely substantive.

Defending Against an Improper Nunc Pro Tunc

• Challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction if plenary power has expired.
• Argue the signed order is the only evidence of rendition if the record supports that position.
• Emphasize that inconsistency with an MSA or mandate does not itself prove clerical error.
• Cite Escobar, A.P.I. Pipe, and Galvan for the actual-rendered-versus-should-have-rendered distinction.
• Preserve the voidness argument on appeal.

Drafting Practices to Avoid This Problem

• Prepare a term-by-term drafting checklist for all final family-law orders.
• Use neutral captions unless the order is truly agreed.
• Include only enforcement mechanisms expressly authorized by the agreement or the court’s rendition.
• Confirm all attachments, exhibits, and referenced payment calculations before circulation.
• Obtain written confirmation from opposing counsel identifying contested versus uncontested language.

Citation

In the Interest of D.L.B., D.L.B., and D.L.B., Minor Children, No. 04-25-00097-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 19, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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