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Penal Code § 22.02 Felony Classification | In the Matter of T.R. (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Matter of T.R., a Juvenile, 06-26-00042-CV, September 29, 2026.

On appeal from 474th District Court, McLennan County, Texas

Synopsis

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is ordinarily a second-degree felony under Texas Penal Code § 22.02(b), absent facts triggering a statutory first-degree classification. When a juvenile transfer order incorrectly described two aggravated-assault offenses as first-degree felonies, the Sixth Court of Appeals modified the order to reflect the correct second-degree classification and affirmed the order as modified.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a juvenile-justice decision rather than a divorce or SAPCR appeal, its procedural lessons apply directly to family-law litigation. Orders affecting conservatorship, possession, protective orders, enforcement, and property division frequently incorporate statutory classifications, predicate findings, or descriptions of underlying conduct. Counsel should verify that those recitals conform to the governing statute and the record because an erroneous label—particularly one suggesting more serious criminal conduct—may affect later custody proceedings, protective-order litigation, professional licensing, employment, or other collateral matters.

The opinion also illustrates the distinction between a correctable error in an order and an error requiring reversal or abatement. Where the record supplies the necessary information and the error is clerical or formal, an appellate court may modify the order under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) rather than remand the case. Conversely, practitioners should not assume that an inaccurate recital is harmless merely because the operative relief remains supportable; preserving and briefing the issue may be necessary to obtain an accurate final order.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The State alleged that T.R., a juvenile, engaged in delinquent conduct by committing two counts of aggravated assault. After the State secured grand-jury approval for determinate sentencing, T.R. pleaded true pursuant to a plea agreement. The juvenile court committed him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for fifteen years, with the possibility of later transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

When T.R. turned eighteen, the State requested a release-or-transfer hearing under Texas Family Code § 54.11. At that hearing, a witness familiar with T.R.’s TJJD history testified that he had committed five confirmed major rule violations involving fighting or assaulting other youths. T.R. had not completed available programming, had been removed from a substance-use program, and had displayed verbal aggression and disruptive behavior. His conduct ultimately resulted in placement in TJJD’s restrictive Phoenix program for violently aggressive youths. TJJD recommended transfer to TDCJ based on the danger it believed T.R. would present if released.

T.R. acknowledged that his institutional record included significant violations but asked the juvenile court to release him and give him another opportunity. After considering the testimony, written reports, recommendations, and statutory factors, the juvenile court ordered T.R. transferred to TDCJ to serve the remainder of his fifteen-year determinate sentence.

The written transfer order stated in one place that T.R. had committed two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon classified as second-degree felonies. Elsewhere, however, it described the same offenses as “aggravated First Degree Felonies.” T.R. appealed both the sufficiency of the order’s explanation and the incorrect felony classification.

Issues Decided

  1. Whether the transfer order was sufficiently specific, when considered with the appellate record, to permit meaningful review of the juvenile court’s decision under Texas Family Code § 54.11.

  2. Whether the order incorrectly classified T.R.’s aggravated-assault offenses as first-degree felonies rather than second-degree felonies under Texas Penal Code § 22.02(b).

  3. Whether the court of appeals could modify the transfer order to correct the erroneous classification instead of abating or remanding the case.

Rules Applied

  • Texas Family Code § 54.11(k): In deciding whether to release a person or transfer that person from TJJD to TDCJ, the juvenile court may consider the person’s experiences and character before and after commitment, the nature and manner of the offense, the person’s ability to contribute to society, protection of the victim and the victim’s family, institutional and prosecutorial recommendations, the person’s best interests, and any other relevant factor.

  • Abuse-of-discretion review: A juvenile court’s decision to transfer a person from TJJD to TDCJ is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The appellate court examines the entire record to determine whether the trial court acted without reference to guiding rules or principles. If some evidence supports the decision, the trial court does not abuse its discretion.

  • Texas Penal Code § 22.02(b): Aggravated assault is generally a second-degree felony. It becomes a first-degree felony only when an applicable statutory circumstance elevates the offense.

  • Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b): A court of appeals may modify a trial court’s judgment and affirm it as modified.

  • Appellate authority to reform an order: Under French v. State and related authority, an appellate court may reform a judgment to make the record speak the truth when the necessary information is available from the record.

  • Transfer-order precedent: Relying on In re A.G. and In re M.C., the court recognized that the written order and appellate record may be considered together when determining whether meaningful appellate review is possible.

Application

T.R. did not challenge the evidentiary sufficiency supporting his transfer to TDCJ. Instead, he argued that the transfer order lacked enough specificity to permit meaningful appellate review and requested abatement for entry of a more detailed order.

The court rejected that argument after examining both the order and the complete appellate record. The order expressly stated that the juvenile court had considered the pleadings, hearing evidence, TJJD recommendations, and the factors identified in § 54.11. The record disclosed the evidence underlying the decision, including T.R.’s repeated fighting or assaultive conduct, failure to complete available programs, verbal aggression, threats of disruption, restrictive placement, and TJJD’s assessment that release would endanger the community. Under the “some evidence” standard, that record was sufficient to support the transfer decision and permit meaningful review.

The felony-classification issue produced a different result. Although part of the order correctly identified the offenses as second-degree felonies, another part described them as first-degree felonies. Texas Penal Code § 22.02(b) classifies aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a second-degree felony unless an applicable statutory circumstance elevates it to the first degree. The record did not establish an applicable first-degree classification.

Because the correct offense descriptions appeared in the record and the mistake did not require additional fact-finding, the court treated the inconsistent recital as a correctable clerical error. Exercising its authority under Rule 43.2(b), the court replaced “aggravated First Degree Felonies” with “aggravated Second Degree Felonies” and affirmed the transfer order as modified.

Holding

The transfer order, considered together with the appellate record, was sufficiently specific to permit meaningful review. The juvenile court stated that it considered the § 54.11 factors, and the record contained evidence supporting its decision to transfer T.R. to TDCJ. Accordingly, the court of appeals overruled T.R.’s request for abatement or a more detailed order.

The order incorrectly described T.R.’s aggravated-assault offenses as first-degree felonies. Under Texas Penal Code § 22.02(b), the offenses were second-degree felonies absent an applicable statutory basis for elevation to the first degree.

The court had the necessary information to correct the error without further trial-court proceedings. It therefore modified the transfer order to classify the offenses as “aggravated Second Degree Felonies” and affirmed the order as modified.

Practical Application

Family-law litigators should treat every statutory recital and characterization in a proposed order as potentially consequential. This is especially important when drafting or reviewing protective orders, findings of family violence, conservatorship orders referencing criminal conduct, and SAPCR orders involving juvenile records. The distinction between an offense, an allegation, an adjudication, and a conviction should be preserved with precision. Likewise, counsel should confirm the correct offense level and avoid language suggesting that conduct satisfies an enhancement provision unless the record supports that conclusion.

In custody litigation, an inaccurate description of a parent’s or child’s conduct may influence future best-interest determinations, modification proceedings, or requests for supervised possession. Even if the operative disposition remains unchanged, counsel should seek correction of any recital that materially overstates the severity of the conduct.

Protective-order practitioners should compare the signed order against the live pleadings, evidence, oral rendition, and applicable statutory provisions. A court’s authority to modify an appellate record does not eliminate the need to preserve complaints. Counsel should object to inaccurate language, request correction before entry, and pursue appropriate post-judgment relief when necessary.

Property litigators can apply the same principle to characterization and valuation findings. An order that inaccurately labels property as community or separate, misstates an entity’s legal status, or uses a finding unsupported by the record may have consequences beyond the immediate decree. Whether an appellate court can modify the judgment will depend on whether the record conclusively supplies the correct information or whether additional judicial fact-finding is required.

Finally, the opinion reinforces the value of building a complete record. A sparse order may still survive appellate review when the record shows that the trial court considered the governing factors and contains some evidence supporting the ruling. For the appellant, that means a generalized attack on the order’s level of detail may be insufficient. For the appellee, it means the entire record—not merely the face of the order—should be used to defend the trial court’s exercise of discretion.

Checklists

Reviewing Statutory Classifications in Proposed Orders

  • Confirm the precise statutory provision governing the conduct.
  • Check the default classification of the offense or statutory ground.
  • Determine whether the record supports any enhancement or elevated classification.
  • Compare every recital in the proposed order for internal consistency.
  • Verify that the order distinguishes allegations from findings, adjudications, and convictions.
  • Remove language suggesting a higher offense level when the statutory predicate is absent.
  • Preserve the relevant statutory version if the law has changed over time.

Preparing for a Discretionary Family-Code Hearing

  • Identify each statutory factor the court may consider.
  • Organize exhibits and testimony by statutory factor.
  • Present institutional, professional, or expert recommendations when relevant.
  • Develop evidence addressing both past conduct and current circumstances.
  • Address best interests, public safety, rehabilitation, and available alternatives.
  • Request express findings on contested or outcome-determinative matters.
  • Ensure that confidential reports are properly admitted, sealed, and included in the appellate record.

Reviewing the Final Order Before Signature

  • Compare the proposed order with the pleadings and requested relief.
  • Compare the proposed order with the court’s oral rendition.
  • Verify names, dates, offense descriptions, property descriptions, and statutory references.
  • Check defined terms and findings for internal consistency.
  • Confirm that the order does not exceed the relief supported by the record.
  • Identify any recital that may produce collateral consequences.
  • Submit written objections or a corrected proposed order before entry when possible.

Preserving an Incorrect-Order Complaint

  • Object specifically to the inaccurate recital or classification.
  • State the correct language and cite the controlling statute.
  • Request correction on the record.
  • File a motion to modify, correct, or reform when appropriate.
  • Ensure that the reporter’s record and relevant exhibits are included in the appellate record.
  • Explain whether the error is clerical, judicial, or requires additional fact-finding.
  • Request appellate modification under Rule 43.2(b) when the record conclusively establishes the correction.

Defending an Order Under Abuse-of-Discretion Review

  • Identify the guiding statutory rules and principles the trial court followed.
  • Cite all evidence supporting the challenged ruling, not merely the evidence highlighted in the order.
  • Connect each material item of evidence to a statutory factor.
  • Emphasize the “some evidence” standard when it applies.
  • Demonstrate that the record permits meaningful appellate review.
  • Distinguish a correctable drafting error from an error affecting the substantive decision.
  • Offer modification as an alternative to reversal when the record supplies the correct language.

Citation

In re T.R., No. 06-26-00042-CV (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 29, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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Tom Daley is a board-certified family law attorney with extensive experience practicing across the United States, primarily in Texas. He represents clients in all aspects of family law, including negotiation, settlement, litigation, trial, and appeals.