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Section 161.001 Predicate Grounds | In re T.D.I., Jr. (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of T.D.I., Jr., a Child, 04-26-00469-CV, November 18, 2026.

On appeal from 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Synopsis

A termination judgment cannot rest on a generalized determination of what arrangement would be best for the child. Because the Department failed to present legally sufficient, clear and convincing evidence of a predicate ground under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), or (O), the Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the termination of Father’s parental rights; it nevertheless affirmed the unchallenged appointment of the Department as sole managing conservator.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion reinforces a critical distinction in termination and custody litigation: evidence supporting a restrictive conservatorship arrangement does not necessarily support the permanent severance of the parent-child relationship. In divorce and SAPCR proceedings, practitioners should similarly distinguish among the statutory standards governing termination, managing conservatorship, possessory conservatorship, possession restrictions, and complete denial of access. The decision also underscores appellate preservation: Father successfully challenged termination but left the conservatorship ruling unchallenged, so the Department remained the child’s sole managing conservator despite reversal of the termination order. The case does not directly affect characterization or division of marital property, but its preservation lesson applies equally to property appeals—each independently adverse ruling must be identified and challenged.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The child was born at 24 weeks after Mother, who had serious medical problems, was found unresponsive and suffering from kidney failure. Mother admitted using heroin during pregnancy and obtaining suboxone outside authorized medical channels. The child experienced withdrawal symptoms and developed substantial medical needs, including chronic lung disease, cerebral palsy, nutritional problems requiring a gastrostomy tube, developmental delays, and a cardiac condition potentially requiring surgery.

At the time of the child’s birth, Father was incarcerated for a domestic-violence incident involving Mother that occurred before the child was conceived. Father learned of the pregnancy only shortly before the birth, and Mother initially represented that another man was the biological father. The Department’s original petition therefore identified Mother and that other man as the child’s parents.

After Father’s release, Mother lived with Father and his mother. Father accompanied Mother when she visited the hospitalized child, but the Department declined to place the child in that household. Its concerns included Mother’s medical condition and substance use, the prior domestic violence, the paternal grandmother’s CPS history, and Mother’s representation that Father was not the biological parent. The child was instead placed in a foster home equipped to manage his significant medical needs.

Mother did not identify Father as a possible biological parent until April 2025. The Department added him to the proceeding the following month, genetic testing was ordered in June, and the initially identified man was dismissed in September after testing excluded him. Mother died that same month. Father was not adjudicated as the child’s parent until several days before the May 2026 trial.

Although his paternity remained unresolved for much of the case, Father agreed to perform services requested by the Department. Evidence showed that he completed substance-abuse and domestic-violence classes, maintained full-time employment, complied with overlapping probation requirements, and never produced a positive drug test. He admitted a relapse following Mother’s death, but the record contained no positive test confirming drug use. The testimony also addressed Father’s attendance at the child’s medical appointments, his inquiries about the child’s condition, and the Department’s position that he had not demonstrated an ability to manage the child’s extensive medical needs.

Only five witnesses testified at trial: the investigating caseworker, two subsequent caseworkers, the foster mother, and Father. The only exhibits were temporary orders and a photograph of the child. The trial court found predicate grounds under section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O), found termination to be in the child’s best interest, terminated Father’s parental rights, and named the Department sole managing conservator.

Issues Decided

  • Whether legally sufficient, clear and convincing evidence supported termination under section 161.001(b)(1)(D), based on knowingly placing or allowing the child to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.

  • Whether legally sufficient, clear and convincing evidence supported termination under section 161.001(b)(1)(E), based on conduct—or knowingly placing the child with persons who engaged in conduct—that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

  • Whether legally sufficient, clear and convincing evidence supported termination under section 161.001(b)(1)(O), based on failure to comply with a court order specifying actions necessary to obtain the child’s return.

  • Whether the appellate court needed to reach the trial court’s best-interest finding after reviewing the predicate grounds.

  • Whether the Department’s appointment as sole managing conservator could be disturbed when Father did not challenge that ruling on appeal.

Rules Applied

Texas Family Code section 161.001(b) requires clear and convincing evidence of both components of termination: at least one predicate ground under subsection (b)(1) and a finding under subsection (b)(2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. A best-interest finding cannot substitute for proof of a predicate ground.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) concerns endangering conditions or surroundings. The inquiry focuses on the child’s environment and whether the parent knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) addresses endangering conduct. It requires proof of a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent, or proof that the parent knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in endangering conduct. Evidence concerning another parent’s behavior does not, without the required statutory connection, establish the ground against the parent whose rights are at issue.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) requires proof that the parent failed to comply with a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of a child who had been in the Department’s conservatorship for the statutory period following removal for abuse or neglect. The Department must prove the statutory elements rather than rely generally on incomplete services or perceived parental shortcomings.

Because termination permanently severs a constitutionally protected relationship, proof must satisfy the clear-and-convincing standard. Citing In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498 (Tex. 2014), and the Texas Supreme Court’s decisions in In re H.S., 741 S.W.3d 4 (Tex. 2026), and In re K.N., 741 S.W.3d 165 (Tex. 2026), the court emphasized that termination is a last resort and that courts must balance the parent’s constitutional rights against the State’s interest in protecting the child.

The court also distinguished termination from conservatorship and possession restrictions. Under Texas Family Code section 153.191, a parent’s access may be denied when possession or access would endanger the child’s physical or emotional welfare. Section 153.193 further provides that restrictions may not exceed those required to protect the child’s best interest. Those provisions illustrate the availability of measures short of permanently extinguishing the legal parent-child relationship.

Application

The appellate court began with the trial judge’s statement that the court’s duty was to the child’s best interest “and not to adults.” The Fourth Court viewed that formulation as incomplete in a termination proceeding. The relevant question was not simply which caregiver offered the preferable home or who was best equipped to address the child’s extraordinary medical needs. The court had to determine whether the Department proved a statutory predicate ground and, only then, whether termination itself was in the child’s best interest.

That distinction mattered because much of the evidence addressed Mother’s prenatal drug use, Mother’s inability to care for the child, the child’s serious medical conditions, and the foster placement’s superior ability to meet those conditions. Those facts explained the removal and supported the need for protective conservatorship orders, but they did not automatically establish that Father knowingly subjected the child to endangering conditions or engaged in a course of endangering conduct.

The timing also informed the court’s analysis. Father was incarcerated when the child was born, Mother had identified another man as the biological father, and Father was not adjudicated as the parent until days before trial. Even before adjudication, however, Father agreed to participate in services. The record showed completion of substance-abuse and domestic-violence classes, continued employment, compliance with probation requirements, and no positive drug tests. His admitted relapse after Mother’s death and the preconception domestic-violence incident were relevant evidence, but the Department still had to connect the evidence to each statutory element by the required clear-and-convincing standard.

The Department also relied on Father’s limited participation in the child’s medical care and his alleged failure to demonstrate that he could independently manage the child’s extensive needs. But proof that a medically complex child requires a highly capable caregiver is not itself proof of endangerment. Nor does a parent’s comparative lack of medical knowledge permit a court to collapse the predicate-ground inquiry into a determination that the foster placement is better situated to care for the child.

As to subsection (O), the sparse evidentiary record did not supply legally sufficient proof of the statutory requirements. The Department introduced only the temporary orders and a photograph, notwithstanding its burden to establish a qualifying court order, the actions required for reunification, and Father’s noncompliance. Testimony that Father had not demonstrated the desired parenting capacity could not replace proof of failure to comply with the specific terms of a qualifying order.

Because none of the three predicate grounds was supported by legally sufficient, clear and convincing evidence, the statutory prerequisite for termination was absent. The appellate court therefore did not reach whether termination was in the child’s best interest.

The conservatorship disposition required a different result. Father did not challenge the order appointing the Department sole managing conservator. The Fourth Court consequently affirmed that portion of the judgment, while noting that the trial court had not considered whether Father should receive possessory-conservator rights or whether another person could serve as managing conservator under Texas Family Code section 263.404(a).

Holding

The Fourth Court held that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish subsection (D). The record did not clearly and convincingly show that Father knowingly placed or allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

The court likewise held the evidence legally insufficient under subsection (E). The evidence concerning Mother’s conduct, Father’s prior domestic-violence offense, his admitted relapse, and his limited involvement with medical appointments did not establish the required endangering course of conduct by clear and convincing evidence.

The court also held that subsection (O) was not established. The Department did not present legally sufficient evidence proving Father’s failure to comply with a qualifying court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the child’s return.

Because no predicate ground survived legal-sufficiency review, the court reversed the termination order without reaching the best-interest challenge. At least one predicate ground under section 161.001(b)(1) must be proven before a best-interest finding can support termination.

Finally, the court affirmed the appointment of the Department as sole managing conservator. Father did not challenge that independent portion of the judgment, and reversal of termination did not authorize the appellate court to grant unrequested relief from the conservatorship ruling.

Practical Application

For Department and ad litem counsel, In re T.D.I., Jr. is a warning against trying a termination case primarily as a comparative-placement dispute. Evidence that foster parents are better trained, more experienced, or more available—particularly for a medically fragile child—may bear on conservatorship and best interest, but it does not independently establish a predicate termination ground. Build the record element by element, and connect each material fact to the parent whose rights are at issue.

For parents’ counsel, separate the evidence into three analytical categories: predicate grounds, best interest, and conservatorship. Evidence may be powerful in one category but legally inadequate in another. A child’s medical vulnerability, for example, may justify extensive possession restrictions without proving that the parent engaged in endangering conduct.

Subsection (O) cases require documentary discipline. The qualifying order should be admitted, its requirements should be identified, and the proof should address compliance with each relevant requirement. A service plan, caseworker expectations, probation conditions, and a court order are not necessarily interchangeable. When paternity is adjudicated late, counsel should also examine when obligations became operative and whether the parent had a meaningful opportunity to comply.

In divorce and private custody litigation, counsel should resist requests that treat termination, denial of access, supervised possession, and ordinary conservatorship restrictions as functionally equivalent remedies. Each form of relief has a distinct statutory threshold. Plead and prove alternative relief so the court can impose the least restrictive order supported by the evidence.

On appeal, challenge every independently adverse component of the judgment. Reversal of termination does not necessarily reverse conservatorship, possession restrictions, support obligations, or related SAPCR rulings. The notice of appeal may invoke jurisdiction, but the briefing must present a developed issue attacking each ruling for which the appellant seeks relief.

Checklists

Proving a Predicate Ground

  • Identify the precise statutory elements of each pleaded ground.
  • Organize testimony and exhibits by element rather than by witness.
  • Connect the conduct to the parent whose rights are subject to termination.
  • Distinguish the other parent’s conduct from evidence attributable to the respondent parent.
  • Establish the parent’s knowledge when the ground contains a knowing-conduct requirement.
  • Address the timing of the alleged conduct, paternity adjudication, removal, and service obligations.
  • Explain why the evidence demonstrates endangerment rather than merely limited parenting experience.
  • Confirm that the complete evidentiary record satisfies the clear-and-convincing standard.

Defending Against Subsections (D) and (E)

  • Separate environmental evidence under subsection (D) from conduct evidence under subsection (E).
  • Challenge efforts to impute one parent’s substance use or neglect automatically to the other parent.
  • Develop evidence concerning when the parent learned of the pregnancy, birth, paternity, and Department case.
  • Document classes completed, employment maintained, testing results, and participation in services.
  • Place isolated incidents in their proper temporal and factual context.
  • Contest attempts to equate poverty, inexperience, or lack of specialized medical training with endangerment.
  • Identify protective conduct, requests for information, appointment attendance, and efforts to participate.
  • Preserve both legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges when supported by the record.

Litigating a Subsection (O) Ground

  • Obtain and admit the signed court order containing the required actions.
  • Confirm that the order specifically identifies what the parent must do to obtain the child’s return.
  • Prove the statutory circumstances and duration of the Department’s conservatorship.
  • Create an element-by-element record of compliance and noncompliance.
  • Distinguish court-ordered requirements from informal caseworker requests.
  • Address the effect of delayed paternity adjudication or delayed service of the operative order.
  • Evaluate any statutory defense or excuse for noncompliance.
  • Avoid relying exclusively on conclusory testimony that the parent “failed services.”

Trying a Medically Complex Child Case

  • Introduce admissible medical records or qualified expert testimony when medical facts are material.
  • Identify the child’s present and anticipated medical requirements.
  • Establish what training the parent was offered and when it was offered.
  • Document notice of appointments and the parent’s ability to attend.
  • Distinguish unwillingness to learn from lack of opportunity or unresolved paternity.
  • Connect any parental omission to an actual or threatened danger to the child.
  • Evaluate whether conservatorship restrictions can protect the child without termination.
  • Present a proposed transition, training, or supervised-possession plan when appropriate.

Preserving Conservatorship Relief on Appeal

  • Identify every independently adverse ruling in the final order.
  • Brief termination, conservatorship, possession, access, and support issues separately.
  • Challenge the appointment of a nonparent managing conservator when relief from that ruling is sought.
  • Address whether the parent should be appointed possessory conservator.
  • Request the precise appellate disposition required for each challenged ruling.
  • Do not assume that reversal of termination automatically alters conservatorship.
  • Verify that the prayer for relief corresponds to every issue presented.
  • Preserve complaints through timely objections, motions, and requests for findings when required.

Drafting the Trial Court’s Order

  • State each predicate ground separately.
  • Include a separate best-interest finding.
  • Distinguish termination findings from conservatorship findings.
  • Address managing and possessory conservatorship independently.
  • Specify any possession restrictions and the evidentiary basis for them.
  • Ensure restrictions do not exceed those required to protect the child’s best interest.
  • Identify the operative service order when subsection (O) is alleged.
  • Avoid language suggesting that generalized best interest alone authorizes termination.

Citation

In re T.D.I., Jr., No. 04-26-00469-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 18, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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Tom Daley is a board-certified family law attorney with extensive experience practicing across the United States, primarily in Texas. He represents clients in all aspects of family law, including negotiation, settlement, litigation, trial, and appeals.