Substance Over Form: Using ‘Wilson’ to Defeat Collateral Attacks on Final Decrees Disguised as Declaratory Judgments
Wilson v. State, 03-26-00099-CR, February 20, 2026.
Synopsis
The Third Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the substance of a pleading, rather than its title, dictates a court’s jurisdiction over a collateral attack on a final judgment. The court held that a party cannot utilize the Declaratory Judgment Act to bypass the exclusive statutory remedies for post-conviction relief, resulting in a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.
Relevance to Family Law
While Wilson arises from a criminal conviction, the “substance over form” doctrine is a critical shield for family law practitioners defending the finality of a Divorce Decree or a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) order. Just as a criminal defendant might attempt to use a declaratory judgment action to end-run the habeas corpus process, family law litigants often attempt to use declaratory actions or “motions to clarify” to substantively alter property divisions or custody provisions years after the plenary power has expired. This case provides high-end appellate support for the proposition that when a collateral attack is disguised as a civil declaratory action, the court must look to the underlying relief sought—and if that relief circumvents exclusive remedies like a Bill of Review or a Motion for Enforcement, the action must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
In 2003, Miles Wilson, Jr. pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to life in prison. Over two decades later, in July 2025, Wilson filed a “pro se Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Request for Disclosure” in the convicting court. Although the petition was couched in civil terms—alleging breach of contract and ultra vires acts by the State’s attorney—the core of Wilson’s complaint was that the State failed to preserve biological evidence for DNA testing as required by Article 38.43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Wilson argued that this failure rendered his plea agreement void, and he sought to be released from the “constraints” of the agreement and returned to the status quo ante. Essentially, Wilson was attempting to use a civil procedural vehicle to vacate a final criminal conviction.
Issues Decided
The primary issue was whether a court of appeals has jurisdiction over an appeal from a denied declaratory judgment action when that action substantively serves as a collateral attack on a final felony conviction. A secondary issue was whether Article 38.43 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides an independent basis for an appeal regarding the destruction of DNA evidence.
Rules Applied
The court relied on the well-established principle that the substance of a filing, not its title, governs its treatment by a reviewing court (Ex parte Caldwell). In the context of criminal law, Article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the “exclusive procedure” for seeking post-conviction relief from a final felony conviction. The court further applied the rule that appellate jurisdiction in Texas is strictly statutory; an appeal is permitted only when specifically authorized by law (Abbott v. State). Finally, the court noted that Courts of Appeals lack original jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus relief in criminal matters, as that power is reserved to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Application
The Third Court of Appeals dissected Wilson’s “Declaratory Judgment” petition and determined that it was, in reality, a collateral attack on his murder conviction. Despite the “breach of contract” labels applied to the plea agreement, the relief Wilson sought—voiding the plea and seeking release—was the functional equivalent of a writ of habeas corpus. The court noted that the legislature has prescribed Article 11.07 as the exclusive remedy for such challenges. Because Wilson was attempting to use the Declaratory Judgment Act as a post-conviction remedy, he was seeking relief that the trial court and the court of appeals lacked the power to grant. Furthermore, regarding the DNA evidence preservation claims, the court found that Article 38.43 does not authorize an independent appeal. Since the legislature has not granted Courts of Appeals the authority to hear appeals on this specific statutory violation outside of the habeas process, the court found it had no choice but to dismiss.
Holding
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal because the appellant’s petition was a substantively a collateral attack on a final felony conviction.
The court further held that Article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the exclusive vehicle for such relief, and the Court of Criminal Appeals—not the Court of Appeals—has exclusive jurisdiction to grant post-conviction habeas relief.
Finally, the court held that because no statute authorizes an independent appeal for the failure to preserve biological evidence under Article 38.43, the appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Practical Application
For the family law litigator, Wilson is an essential tool for maintaining the integrity of the “Agreement Incident to Divorce” (AID) or a Final Decree. When an opposing party files a “Petition for Declaratory Judgment” seeking to interpret a property division in a way that effectively reallocates assets (a collateral attack), Wilson supports a Plea to the Jurisdiction. You must argue that the “substance” of their suit is a challenge to a final judgment, which can only be brought via a Bill of Review (if the requirements are met) or through the specific enforcement/clarification procedures in Texas Family Code Chapter 9. If the litigant has missed the four-year window for a Bill of Review, they cannot use the Declaratory Judgment Act to revive their claim.
Checklists
Identifying a Disguised Collateral Attack
- Analyze the requested relief: Does the petition seek to render a prior order “void” or “unenforceable”?
- Check the timing: Is the petition filed after the court’s plenary power has expired?
- Examine the statutory basis: Is the party using the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) to challenge a judgment where a specific remedy (like a Bill of Review or a Family Code clarification motion) exists?
- Assess the “Status Quo Ante” request: If the party is asking to be returned to the position they were in before the decree was signed, it is a collateral attack.
Challenging Jurisdiction under the Wilson Doctrine
- File a Plea to the Jurisdiction: Argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the exclusive remedy has not been followed.
- Cite the “Substance Over Form” Rule: Reference Wilson v. State and Ex parte Caldwell to demand the court look past the title of the pleading.
- Highlight the Exclusive Remedy: Identify the specific Texas Family Code sections (e.g., Chapter 9 for property or Chapter 157 for SAPCR) that the legislature intended to be the sole vehicles for relief.
- Move for Dismissal: Request dismissal for want of jurisdiction rather than summary judgment, as a jurisdictional defect precludes the court from reaching the merits.
Citation
Wilson v. State, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. App.—Austin 2026, no pet.).
Full Opinion
Family Law Crossover
In Texas family law, the “Wilson” logic can be weaponized to defeat “end-run” litigation. For example, in a high-asset divorce where a party later discovers a potential “breach” of a representation made in an Agreement Incident to Divorce (AID), they might be tempted to sue for a declaratory judgment that the contract is void due to fraud. However, because that AID was incorporated into a Final Decree, any suit to set it aside is a collateral attack on the judgment itself. Under Wilson, you can argue that the court must ignore the “contract” or “declaratory” labels. Since the finality of the decree is at stake, the party’s exclusive remedy is a Bill of Review. If they cannot meet the rigorous “extrinsic fraud” standard required for a Bill of Review, they cannot use the UDJA as a “back door” to litigate the same issues. Wilson reminds the court that it cannot exercise jurisdiction over a civil action that is merely a criminal habeas (or in our case, a bill of review) in sheep’s clothing.
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