Second Court of Appeals Affirms 30-Year Protective Order but Reverses Attorney’s Fees for Insufficient Evidence

Mahasneh v. Mahasneh, 02-25-00076-CV, March 19, 2026.

On appeal from the 325th District Court, Tarrant County, Texas.

Synopsis

The Second Court of Appeals affirmed a thirty-year protective order issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, finding the evidence of stalking and prior protective order violations sufficient to support the extended duration. However, the court reversed the award of attorney’s fees, holding that the testimony provided by the movant’s counsel was legally insufficient to satisfy the rigorous lodestar requirements established by Texas Supreme Court precedent.

Relevance to Family Law

For the Texas family law practitioner, Mahasneh serves as a critical reminder of the procedural distinctions between protective orders sought under Title 4 of the Family Code versus Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While Chapter 7B provides a powerful tool for long-term protection in cases involving stalking—often bypassing the more restrictive findings required under the Family Code—it does not exempt the prevailing party from the stringent evidentiary standards for attorney’s fees. This case underscores that even in high-conflict litigation involving physical safety, counsel must be prepared to present detailed billing evidence or risk a reversal on fee awards.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The parties were married for fourteen years before separating in 2014. The history of the relationship was marked by significant domestic instability, including a 2016 arrest of the Appellant (S.M.) for assaulting the Appellee (T.M.) and a subsequent indictment for violating a protective order multiple times within a twelve-month period. During their divorce proceedings, a protective order was in place until 2020. In 2024, following the expiration of S.M.’s criminal probation, T.M. reported a pattern of stalking, which included S.M. placing a GPS tracking device on her vehicle, leaving numerous ambient and pleading voicemails, and surveilling her place of employment from a nearby parking lot.

At the 2025 evidentiary hearing, T.M. testified to these events, and S.M. invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination regarding several key allegations. The trial court, drawing negative inferences from S.M.’s silence, found reasonable grounds to believe T.M. was a victim of stalking and that S.M. posed a credible threat to the safety of T.M. and her household. Consequently, the court issued a protective order with a thirty-year duration and awarded T.M. $2,250 in attorney’s fees based on her counsel’s testimony.

Issues Decided

1. Whether the trial court violated S.M.’s due process rights by prohibiting communication with his children without specific findings by clear and convincing evidence.
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting the protective order under Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure without proper notice.
3. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the thirty-year duration of the protective order.
4. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the $2,250 award for attorney’s fees.

Rules Applied

The court looked to Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically Article 7B.003, which allows for a protective order if the court finds reasonable grounds to believe the applicant is a victim of stalking. Unlike Title 4 of the Family Code, Chapter 7B does not require a finding that family violence is likely to occur in the future if the court finds the applicant was a victim of certain enumerated offenses.

Regarding the duration of the order, the court applied Article 7B.007, which permits a protective order to be effective for the duration of the lives of the offender and victim or any shorter period. For the attorney’s fees issue, the court applied the lodestar method as clarified in Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2019), which requires evidence of the reasonable hours worked, the reasonable hourly rate, and the specific tasks performed.

Application

In evaluating the due process claims, the court noted that S.M. failed to preserve his constitutional arguments in the trial court. Furthermore, the court distinguished the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Stary v. Etheridge, noting that the protections in Mahasneh extended to adult children, a scenario where the fundamental right to parent is significantly diminished compared to minor children. The court found that because the order was issued under Chapter 7B, the trial court was not required to make the specific “family violence” findings mandated by the Family Code.

On the issue of the thirty-year duration, the court found the evidence of S.M.’s persistent behavior—ranging from the 2016 assault to the 2024 GPS tracking and surveillance—sufficient to justify the trial court’s “life of the offender” rationale. However, the application of the law to the attorney’s fees was fatal to that portion of the judgment. The Appellee’s counsel provided only a total dollar amount and a general statement that the fees were reasonable and necessary. The court determined this was a “conclusory” showing that failed to provide the “base lodestar” data required by Rohrmoos, such as the specific tasks performed or the time spent on each.

Holding

The court affirmed the thirty-year protective order. The court held that the evidence of stalking and prior violations of protective orders provided a legally sufficient basis for the trial court’s findings under Chapter 7B. The court further held that the thirty-year duration was within the trial court’s discretion under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The court reversed the award of attorney’s fees and remanded the issue for a new trial. The court held that T.M. failed to provide legally sufficient evidence of the reasonableness and necessity of the fees because her counsel did not testify to the specific tasks performed, the time spent on those tasks, or the hourly rate, thereby failing to establish the required lodestar.

Practical Application

Practitioners should view this case as a cautionary tale regarding the “short-cut” approach to proving attorney’s fees in protective order hearings. While these hearings often feel summary in nature, the appellate standards for fee awards are unyielding. If you are representing a movant, you must either introduce a detailed billing statement or provide testimony that mirrors the lodestar factors.

Strategically, this case highlights the utility of Chapter 7B. When a client is being stalked, Chapter 7B may offer a more streamlined path to a lifetime or long-term protective order than the Family Code, especially when the respondent has a history of violating prior orders. However, counsel must ensure the pleadings explicitly invoke Chapter 7B to avoid notice-based appeals, though the court here was lenient on that point.

Checklists

Proving Stalking for an Extended Protective Order

• Identify Prior Violations: Document all instances where the respondent violated previous temporary or permanent orders.
• Establish Surveillance: Introduce evidence of GPS tracking, frequent “drive-bys,” or presence at the movant’s workplace.
• Preserve Electronic Evidence: Admit all voicemails, text messages, and emails, even if they appear “ambient” or non-threatening on the surface, to establish a pattern of conduct.
• Utilize Negative Inferences: If the respondent invokes the Fifth Amendment in the civil hearing, explicitly request the court to draw negative inferences regarding the stalking allegations.

Satisfying the Lodestar Standard for Fees

• Detailed Billing Records: Always have redacted billing records ready for admission.
• Testimony on Tasks: If testifying as an expert, describe specific categories of work (e.g., “three hours for drafting the application,” “two hours for witness preparation”).
• Rate Justification: Testify to your hourly rate and why it is reasonable based on your experience and the Tarrant County (or applicable local) market.
• The “Base Lodestar”: Ensure the record contains the math: [Reasonable Hours] x [Reasonable Rate] = [Total].

Citation

Mahasneh v. Mahasneh, No. 02-25-00076-CV, 2026 WL ______ (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 19, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

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