Stalking Protective Order Under Chapter 7B: Rideout v. Rideout (2026)

Rideout v. Rideout, 02-25-00231-CV, May 14, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law, Hood County, Texas

Synopsis

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a Chapter 7B protective order based on evidence of stalking where the respondent repeatedly monitored, followed, messaged, and confronted his former spouse despite prior restrictions on proximity and communication. For family-law practitioners, the opinion confirms that a pattern of unwanted in-person surveillance, electronic harassment, and boundary violations can satisfy Penal Code Section 42.072 and support a stalking-based protective order even when many of the individual incidents arise in ordinary post-divorce co-parenting settings.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters in divorce, SAPCR, post-divorce enforcement, and modification practice because the conduct at issue occurred in the exact places family litigants commonly continue to encounter one another: churches, youth sports, restaurants, neighborhoods, and co-parenting communication platforms. Rideout shows that a litigant cannot sanitize stalking behavior by embedding it within child-related events or by characterizing repeated proximity, digital messaging, and location monitoring as mere efforts to remain involved with the child. For practitioners, the case is especially useful where protective-order relief intersects with conservatorship disputes, possession exchanges, Rule 11 communication protocols, injunction enforcement, and the tactical use of third-party documentation to prove a course of conduct rather than isolated bad acts.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The parties were formerly married, shared a son, and divorced in 2020. After the divorce, Hallie moved to Granbury. According to the opinion, Colby then began appearing in places associated with Hallie’s personal life in a manner she had expressly opposed. He attended her church, refused her request to attend a different service, sat near her, repeatedly looked toward her during worship, and joined a nearby Sunday school class.

The conduct then expanded into child-related settings. When the child began soccer, Colby traveled from Cleburne to Granbury not only for games but also for every practice session. Hallie testified that he intentionally sat next to her and, when she moved away, he followed her with his chair. She also described a confrontation at Sonic in which Colby blocked her vehicle and angrily confronted her over soccer team pictures.

The post-divorce conflict intensified after Hallie pursued child-support enforcement. The parties resolved that matter through a Rule 11 agreement requiring communication exclusively through AppClose. The next day, Colby advised Hallie through that platform that he was moving to a neighborhood immediately behind hers. After relocating, he appeared in overlapping spaces, including her gym, a restaurant where she was eating, and grocery stores she frequented.

The electronic communications were also significant. Hallie testified that Colby sent numerous messages criticizing her parenting, calling her a horrible mother, and attacking her family. She said the volume and tone of the communications made her feel scared and that he continued after being asked to stop. She further testified that when she visited a different church in Granbury without telling anyone, Colby messaged her after the service that her Jeep was easy to spot from the highway and said that if she took their son to a different church, he would follow him wherever he went. That incident was particularly important because it tended to show active monitoring of her location.

In March 2024, Colby agreed, in connection with child-support proceedings, to permanent injunctions that included a 30-foot stay-away restriction unless Hallie gave written consent. Yet in May 2024, he came within that distance at a baseball practice, repeatedly tried to speak with her, lingered after practice, insisted on walking Hallie and the child to her vehicle, and became agitated when Hallie invoked the distance restriction. Hallie testified that she feared the situation was becoming physical and that a male friend had to intervene to deescalate it.

The trial court ultimately found reasonable grounds to believe that Colby had committed stalking and entered a Chapter 7B protective order. The order, as amended, required him to stay 200 feet away from Hallie, her residence, and her workplace for two years.

Issues Decided

• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of reasonable grounds to believe the respondent committed stalking under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

• Whether the evidence was factually sufficient to support that same finding.

• Whether the respondent’s repeated conduct satisfied the statutory elements of stalking under Texas Penal Code Section 42.072, including predicate harassment under Penal Code Section 42.07.

• The opinion also notes that constitutional challenges were raised, both facially and as applied, and that the court affirmed notwithstanding those challenges.

Rules Applied

Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs protective orders for victims of certain offenses, including stalking. Under Article 7B.003, once an application is filed, the trial court must determine whether reasonable grounds exist to believe the applicant is the victim of stalking; if so, the court shall issue a protective order including the required findings.

The stalking definition came from Texas Penal Code Section 42.072. As recited by the court, stalking requires proof that, on more than one occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct directed at a specific person, the respondent knowingly engaged in conduct that:

• constitutes harassment under Penal Code Section 42.07;

• causes the complainant to feel harassed, terrified, intimidated, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended; and

• would cause a reasonable person to experience those same reactions under the circumstances.

The court relied on Penal Code Section 42.07 for the predicate harassment component. The opinion specifically highlighted two forms of harassment relevant here:

• sending repeated electronic communications in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another; and

• tracking or monitoring the personal property or motor vehicle of another person without effective consent.

On review, the court applied ordinary legal- and factual-sufficiency standards applicable to fact findings after a bench trial. It cited authorities such as In re Doe, Gunn v. McCoy, City of Keller v. Wilson, Pool v. Ford Motor Co., Cain v. Bain, and Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson to frame the deferential approach to the trial court’s credibility and weight determinations.

Application

The court treated the case as a classic course-of-conduct record rather than a dispute over any single dramatic incident. That framing is important. The evidence did not depend solely on one threat, one confrontation, or one message. Instead, the record reflected repeated attendance in Hallie’s spaces after she made clear that the contact was unwanted, recurrent efforts to place himself physically next to her at child activities, escalating digital communications, apparent monitoring of her vehicle and whereabouts, and a later violation of an agreed distance restriction.

That accumulation allowed the trial court to find more than interpersonal friction between former spouses. The appellate court emphasized evidence that Colby had sent repeated electronic communications attacking Hallie’s parenting and family, had continued despite her request that he stop, and had monitored the location of her Jeep when she visited a different church. In the court’s view, this was probative not only of harassment under Section 42.07 but also of the larger stalking framework under Section 42.072.

The court also gave weight to Hallie’s testimony about the effect of the conduct on her. She testified that the messaging made her feel scared, that the church-monitoring incident frightened her, and that the baseball-practice confrontation caused her to fear physical escalation. Because stalking under Section 42.072 includes both a subjective component and an objective reasonable-person component, the trial court was entitled to credit her testimony and then measure the same conduct against what a reasonable person would feel under similar circumstances.

Just as importantly, the court appears to have treated the prior Rule 11 communication limitation and the later injunctions as contextual evidence showing notice and disregard of boundaries. In family-law practice, that point is critical. When a litigant has already been told to communicate only through a designated platform or to remain outside a specified perimeter, later violations carry enhanced evidentiary force. They help establish intent, course of conduct, and the unreasonableness of the respondent’s explanations.

Holding

The court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the protective order. It concluded that the record contained credible evidence of repeated electronic harassment, monitoring of Hallie’s location or vehicle, repeated unwanted proximity, and conduct that caused Hallie fear and alarm. On that record, the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe Colby committed stalking as defined by Penal Code Section 42.072, thereby triggering relief under Chapter 7B.

The court further held, in affirming the order, that repeated unwanted surveillance, following behavior, threatening or intimidating communications, and disregard of prior distance restrictions can collectively satisfy the required stalking elements even when the conduct occurs against the backdrop of ongoing co-parenting. The case thus reinforces that post-divorce access to shared child activities does not create immunity from a stalking finding when the evidence shows a deliberate course of conduct directed at the former spouse.

Practical Application

For Texas family-law litigators, Rideout is a practical roadmap for both prosecution and defense of stalking-based protective orders in the post-divorce setting. On the applicant’s side, the case underscores the value of building a chronology that connects communications, physical appearances, vehicle monitoring, and prior court-imposed boundaries into a single narrative of targeted conduct. Judges are more likely to see stalking when counsel presents the evidence as a pattern with continuity, escalation, and disregard for express objections.

The opinion is especially useful in cases involving co-parenting apps. Too often, lawyers treat app messages as merely discovery fodder for conservatorship disputes. Rideout confirms they may be central stalking evidence when they show repeated hostile communications, refusal to stop after request, or attempts to control, intimidate, or torment the other parent. Counsel should therefore preserve message exports, timestamps, volume metrics, and contextual links to in-person conduct.

The case also has significance in modification and enforcement matters. If one party repeatedly appears at extracurricular events, sits or stands immediately beside the other parent, follows when the other moves away, or uses the child’s activities as a pretext for unwanted contact, Rideout provides authority to argue that such conduct is not merely awkward co-parenting. Depending on the full course of conduct, it may support injunctive relief, restrictions on exchange logistics, communication protocols, and a stalking-based protective order.

For respondents, the case is a warning that “I was there for the child” is not a complete defense when the surrounding facts suggest deliberate targeting of the other parent. The same is true of “coincidental” overlap in public spaces after a move into the other parent’s neighborhood, sudden attendance at the same church or gym, or repeated communications that far exceed legitimate co-parenting needs. Defense counsel should focus on breaking the alleged course of conduct into legitimate, child-centered interactions supported by neutral evidence, while also addressing any app-message overuse, surveillance evidence, or prior injunction violations that will otherwise dominate the record.

Strategically, Rideout also suggests that prior agreed restrictions matter. Rule 11 agreements, temporary orders, injunctions, and communication limitations can become powerful predicate evidence in a later protective-order hearing. Family lawyers should draft those provisions carefully, preserve proof of service and assent, and document later violations with precision.

Checklists

Building a Chapter 7B Stalking Record

• Create a dated timeline of all incidents, not just the most serious ones.
• Group conduct by category: electronic communications, physical following, surveillance, confrontation, and order violations.
• Preserve co-parenting app exports with timestamps and full message threads.
• Obtain screenshots, photos, video, call logs, location-related messages, and witness statements.
• Tie each incident to a prior request to stop, a communication protocol, or a distance restriction when applicable.
• Develop testimony addressing both subjective fear and why a reasonable person would react similarly.
• Show continuity of purpose so the court sees a single scheme or course of conduct.

Proving Harassment Under Penal Code Section 42.07

• Identify repeated electronic communications that were unnecessary for child-related coordination.
• Highlight insulting, threatening, demeaning, or relentless message content.
• Establish that the applicant asked the respondent to stop or reduce the communications.
• Present evidence of tracking or monitoring a vehicle or location without consent.
• Use message volume, timing, and tone to show intent to harass, alarm, torment, or offend.
• Connect digital conduct to in-person conduct to strengthen the stalking theory.

Using Family-Law Orders as Evidence

• Offer the Rule 11 agreement, temporary orders, injunctions, or enforcement orders into evidence.
• Emphasize provisions limiting proximity, communication method, or contact parameters.
• Prove the respondent knew of the restrictions.
• Document specific later incidents that violated those restrictions.
• Argue that violations are evidence of notice, intent, and willful continuation of the course of conduct.

Preparing the Applicant’s Testimony

• Have the client explain when and how the conduct became unwanted.
• Develop testimony on concrete emotional effects: fear, alarm, intimidation, disruption of worship, parenting, work, or daily life.
• Include why particular incidents were frightening, especially those showing location monitoring or physical escalation.
• Identify corroborating witnesses from sports events, church, work, or social settings.
• Keep the testimony focused on patterns and escalation rather than generalized marital grievances.

Defending Against a Stalking-Based Protective Order

• Separate legitimate child-related conduct from alleged personal targeting.
• Produce neutral documentation showing the purpose for attendance at events or communications.
• Address message volume and tone candidly; do not assume child-related subject matter cures otherwise abusive delivery.
• Rebut any inference of monitoring with specific evidence, not general denials.
• Confront alleged stay-away or injunction violations directly and explain consent or impossibility only where the facts truly support it.
• Avoid overreliance on “public place” arguments when the pattern suggests deliberate proximity.

Drafting and Enforcing Protective Boundaries in Family Cases

• Use precise stay-away distances and define exceptions clearly.
• Specify approved communication channels and subject-matter limits for co-parenting messages.
• Include exchange protocols and extracurricular-event boundaries when conflict is chronic.
• Make written-consent provisions explicit if proximity exceptions may arise.
• Advise clients that repeated “incidental” contact can later be framed as stalking evidence.
• Promptly document and address early violations before the pattern deepens.

Citation

Rideout v. Rideout, No. 02-25-00231-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 14, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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