UIFSA Section 159.205 Bars Interstate Transfer of Child Support | In re Office of the Attorney General of Texas (2026)

In re Office of the Attorney General of Texas, 03-26-00523-CV, July 30, 2026.

On appeal from 201st District Court of Travis County, Texas

Synopsis

Texas cannot transfer the child-support portion of a SAPCR to another state while UIFSA continuing, exclusive jurisdiction remains in Texas under Family Code section 159.205(a). If the obligor, obligee, or child still resides in Texas, an order purporting to send support issues to another state is an abuse of discretion, and mandamus is the proper remedy.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters well beyond Title IV-D practice. In relocation disputes, modification suits, enforcement proceedings, and post-divorce litigation, family lawyers often confront a split-jurisdiction problem: custody may be governed by UCCJEA principles pointing toward another state, while support remains anchored in Texas under UIFSA. In re Office of the Attorney General of Texas reinforces that these two systems do not move in lockstep. A court may lose or decline custody jurisdiction in favor of another state, but that does not mean it can divest Texas of support jurisdiction when section 159.205(a) still gives Texas continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Practitioners handling divorce decrees, SAPCRs, and modifications must therefore treat conservatorship and support as potentially severable jurisdictional tracks.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The Office of the Attorney General originally filed the underlying SAPCR in Travis County in 2020, seeking conservatorship and child support orders. The trial court entered temporary orders addressing both parental rights and support, including a finding that Father had a duty to support the child. Mother and the child later moved to Arizona in 2022, while Father remained in Texas.

In 2026, Father filed an enforcement and temporary-orders pleading relating to possession and access, and he also referenced the possibility of an agreement touching conservatorship, possession, access, and support. Mother responded with a special appearance and a motion asking the Texas court to transfer the case to Arizona or stay the proceedings, relying on UCCJEA concepts concerning continuing jurisdiction and inconvenient forum. Her proposed order included language transferring not just custody-related matters but also the child-support portion of the SAPCR. The trial court signed an order transferring the entire case to Maricopa County, Arizona, and cited Family Code section 155.301.

The OAG then sought mandamus relief, arguing that whatever might be true as to custody, Texas could not transfer the support component to Arizona because UIFSA gives the issuing state continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over support so long as one of the relevant parties remains in Texas. Mother agreed the support transfer should not have occurred, characterizing it as a clerical mistake, but argued that mandamus was unnecessary because the problem could be fixed through nunc pro tunc relief.

Issues Decided

• Whether Texas Family Code section 159.205(a) permits a Texas court to transfer the child-support portion of a SAPCR to another state when the obligor remains in Texas.
• Whether Family Code section 155.301 authorizes an interstate transfer of the child-support portion of a SAPCR.
• Whether mandamus is the proper remedy to vacate an interlocutory interstate transfer order purporting to transfer support jurisdiction.
• Whether the erroneous inclusion of child-support transfer language could be treated as a clerical error correctable by judgment nunc pro tunc.

Rules Applied

The court centered its analysis on UIFSA’s continuing, exclusive jurisdiction provision, Texas Family Code section 159.205(a). Under that statute, with exceptions not applicable here, the issuing state retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child-support order as long as the obligor, obligee, or child resides in that state.

The court also addressed Texas Family Code section 155.301, which concerns transfer of SAPCR proceedings within Texas. Relying in part on In re K.B.A., 145 S.W.3d 685, 688 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.), the court treated section 155.301 as an intrastate transfer statute only, not a vehicle for moving support jurisdiction to another state.

On mandamus standards, the court cited In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding), and Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992), for the familiar requirements of clear abuse of discretion and no adequate appellate remedy. It also relied on authorities recognizing that nonfinal transfer orders are typically not immediately appealable, including Chalu v. Shamala, 125 S.W.3d 737, 738–39 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.), In re C.K.M., 709 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. 2025), and Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014.

Most significantly, the court aligned itself with In re Meekins, 550 S.W.3d 729, 747–48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, orig. proceeding), which held that even where a Texas court properly transfers child-custody issues under the UCCJEA, UIFSA does not allow the support determination to follow to another state if Texas retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

Finally, the court rejected the nunc pro tunc theory by invoking the distinction between clerical and judicial error recognized in Texas Department of Transportation v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. 2013), and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 316.

Application

The Third Court treated the case as a straightforward collision between two different jurisdictional regimes that family lawyers too often collapse into one. Mother’s motion was framed under the UCCJEA, which can support a transfer or declination of jurisdiction over custody-related matters when the child and custodial parent have relocated or when Texas is an inconvenient forum. But the signed order went further: it purported to transfer the entire SAPCR, including support, to Arizona. That is where the order failed.

The court explained that section 155.301 did not save the order because that statute governs transfer of proceedings within Texas. It does not authorize a Texas court to export support jurisdiction to another state. Once the court moved from intrastate transfer law to interstate support law, UIFSA controlled. And under section 159.205(a), Texas retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction because Father—the obligor—still resided in Texas. That statutory fact was dispositive.

The court also had little difficulty finding mandamus appropriate. The transfer order did not finally dispose of the SAPCR, did not contain finality language, and was not among the interlocutory orders subject to immediate appeal. That practical reality mattered. By the time Mother later attempted nunc pro tunc relief, the clerk had already rejected the filing because the case had been transferred out to Arizona. The appellate court accordingly rejected the notion that the OAG had an adequate remedy short of mandamus.

Just as importantly, the court refused to characterize the problem as a clerical mistake. Even if the inclusion of support language in the proposed order was inadvertent, the signed order reflected a judicial act that incorrectly applied the law. That makes the defect judicial, not clerical. In other words, the order did not merely misrecord what the trial court actually rendered; it rendered relief the court had no power to grant.

Holding

The court held that Texas Family Code section 159.205(a) barred transfer of the child-support portion of the SAPCR to Arizona because Texas, as the issuing state, retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction while Father remained a Texas resident. UIFSA controlled the support-jurisdiction question, and no exception displaced Texas jurisdiction on these facts.

The court separately held that Family Code section 155.301 did not authorize the interstate transfer order. That statute applies only to transfers within Texas and cannot be used to send the support component of a SAPCR to another state.

The court further held that mandamus was the proper remedy because the transfer order was nonfinal and not subject to interlocutory appeal. The OAG therefore lacked an adequate appellate remedy.

Finally, the court held that the error was judicial rather than clerical, so nunc pro tunc was not an adequate substitute for mandamus in these circumstances. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the transfer order to the extent it transferred the child-support portion of the case to Arizona.

Practical Application

For Texas family litigators, the strategic lesson is clear: do not assume that a successful UCCJEA transfer or inconvenient-forum motion carries support jurisdiction with it. When a parent and child relocate, custody and support must be analyzed separately, and counsel should expect a bifurcated result if one of the UIFSA anchors remains in Texas. A court may conclude that Arizona should handle conservatorship, possession, and access, while Texas must continue to handle support establishment, modification, or enforcement.

This has immediate consequences in divorce and post-decree practice. If you represent the obligor who remains in Texas, this case gives you a strong basis to resist any attempt to transfer support proceedings out of state. If you represent the relocating parent, you need to calibrate client expectations early: obtaining another state’s custody forum does not automatically consolidate support there. And if you draft proposed transfer orders, precision matters. A broad “entire case is transferred” formulation may trigger reversible error and collateral delay.

The case also matters in enforcement settings. Lawyers sometimes plead enforcement, modification, and forum-transfer theories in a single package. After this opinion, the safer course is to separate the requested relief expressly and to make the record equally explicit: any transfer request pertains to custody jurisdiction only, not child support, unless UIFSA prerequisites for another state’s modification jurisdiction are actually met.

For appellate preservation and extraordinary relief, practitioners should treat an improper interstate support transfer as a mandamus problem, not an ordinary appeal problem. The opinion underscores that once the file is administratively shipped out, practical barriers to correction multiply. Waiting for a final judgment may be unrealistic, and reliance on nunc pro tunc is risky because the defect will often be characterized as judicial error.

Checklists

Drafting and Opposing Interstate Transfer Motions

• Identify separately whether the requested transfer concerns:
• conservatorship
• possession and access
• child support
• enforcement
• modification
• Cite the correct jurisdictional framework for each subject:
• UCCJEA for custody determinations
• UIFSA for support determinations
• Determine whether the obligor, obligee, or child still resides in Texas under Family Code section 159.205(a).
• Do not cite Family Code section 155.301 as authority for an interstate transfer of support.
• If seeking custody transfer only, state expressly that the request excludes child-support jurisdiction.
• Object to any proposed order that transfers the “entire case” without carving out support.

Preserving UIFSA Continuing, Exclusive Jurisdiction Arguments

• Plead UIFSA section 159.205(a) specifically.
• Establish in the record the current residence of:
• obligor
• obligee
• child
• Confirm that Texas is the issuing state for the support order.
• Address whether any UIFSA exception applies before the hearing.
• Request express findings or limiting language in the transfer order preserving Texas support jurisdiction.
• Provide the trial court with a proposed order that separates custody transfer from support retention.

Mandamus Readiness Checklist

• Obtain the signed transfer order immediately.
• Confirm whether the order is nonfinal and lacks appealable finality language.
• Evaluate whether the order is outside the interlocutory appeal statute.
• Assemble a mandamus record including:
• the transfer motion
• response
• proposed order
• signed order
• relevant prior support orders
• proof of party residences
• Cite In re Meekins and this case for the proposition that mandamus is the proper remedy.
• Seek emergency relief promptly if transfer out of state will impair further filings or trial-court correction.

Proposed Order Review Checklist

• Verify the statutory basis recited in the order.
• Remove any language transferring support unless UIFSA affirmatively allows it.
• Specify which claims remain pending in Texas.
• Confirm whether the order addresses only custody jurisdiction.
• Check whether the order inadvertently includes global transfer language copied from another template.
• Circulate redlines before submission to reduce the risk of invited judicial error.

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Party’s Mistake

• Do not assume relocation plus UCCJEA arguments resolve support jurisdiction.
• Do not append support-transfer language to a proposed order without a UIFSA analysis.
• Do not rely on nunc pro tunc as a fallback for a signed order that grants unauthorized relief.
• Do not wait for a final judgment to challenge an improper interstate support transfer.
• Do not overlook administrative consequences once the clerk treats the case as transferred out of state.

Citation

In re Office of the Attorney General of Texas, No. 03-26-00523-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Austin June 30, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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