Parenting Facilitator Authority Under Family Code § 153.6061: In re G.H.G. (2026)

In the Interest of G.H.G. and H.R.G., 05-25-00349-CV, August 20, 2026.

On appeal from 255th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Synopsis

The Dallas Court of Appeals held that a divorce decree may authorize a parenting facilitator to determine when a parent advances through phases of a step-up possession schedule without violating Texas Family Code §§ 153.606 and 153.6061, so long as the decree preserves the trial court’s exclusive jurisdiction over conservatorship, possession, access, and support. The court also held that decree language mirroring the mediated settlement agreement and clarifying that the facilitator’s appointment does not divest the court of authority does not impermissibly add to or materially alter the parties’ MSA.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion is directly relevant to divorce and SAPCR practitioners who draft graduated possession provisions, restricted-access schedules, and MSA-based decrees involving mental-health, medication-compliance, or reunification concerns. The case gives useful appellate support for decree language allowing a parenting facilitator to serve as a gatekeeper for progression within a step-up schedule, while also underscoring two recurring litigation risks: first, the importance of preserving the court’s exclusive decision-making authority in the decree itself, and second, the danger of appellate complaints that are undercut by the party’s own proposed language or by inadequate preservation in the trial court.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The case arose from a Dallas County divorce in which the parties resolved their disputes through a mediated settlement agreement. The MSA created a three-phase supervised step-up possession schedule for Father. In the Phase One language, the agreement provided that after six weeks of supervised possession, and assuming there had been no violations of permanent mutual injunctions and Father was taking his medications, Father would move to Phase Two “upon the determination of the parenting facilitator and/or party managing Father’s medication.”

Elsewhere, however, the MSA included a separate section specifically titled “Parenting Facilitator,” and that section stated more broadly that “the Parenting Facilitator shall determine when Father can move to the next phase of the Step-Up Possession Schedule.” That broader language became central to the appeal because Father later argued the facilitator’s role was narrower and applied only to the move from Phase One to Phase Two, not from Phase Two to Phase Three.

The MSA also contained an arbitration provision for disputes regarding the language of the agreed final decree of divorce. Arbitration followed. The arbitrator issued rulings, and Father challenged portions of those rulings, including language concerning the parenting facilitator and the decree form itself. After hearings on Father’s motions, the trial court signed a revised agreed final decree of divorce in February 2025.

The decree stated that Phase Two would continue until the parenting facilitator determined that Father could move to the next phase of the possession schedule. It further provided that the parenting facilitator would determine whether Father could move up and whether he was seeing a licensed psychiatrist, following recommendations, and taking medications as prescribed. Critically, before that operative language, the decree expressly stated that appointment of the parenting facilitator did not divest the court of its exclusive jurisdiction to determine conservatorship, support, possession, and access, or its authority to manage and control the suit.

Father appealed, arguing both that the decree failed to comply with the MSA and that it vested the parenting facilitator with authority beyond that permitted by Family Code §§ 153.606 and 153.6061.

Issues Decided

• Whether the final divorce decree failed to comply with the mediated settlement agreement by authorizing the parenting facilitator to determine advancement from Phase Two to Phase Three of the step-up possession schedule.

• Whether the decree violated Texas Family Code §§ 153.606 and 153.6061 by authorizing the parenting facilitator to determine when Father could move to the next phase of the step-up possession schedule.

• Whether language clarifying that the parenting facilitator’s appointment did not divest the trial court of exclusive jurisdiction impermissibly added to or altered the MSA.

Rules Applied

The court applied several familiar family-law and appellate rules:

• A trial court’s judgment rendered on a mediated settlement agreement is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

• A judgment based on an MSA should not be reversed unless it adds terms, significantly alters the original terms, or undermines the parties’ intent.

• MSAs are construed under contract principles, with reference to the entire writing, and language is given its plain meaning unless doing so defeats the parties’ intent.

• Divorce decrees are interpreted as a whole under the general rules applicable to judgments.

• Under Texas Family Code § 153.606(a) and § 153.6061, a parenting facilitator’s duties are limited to functions that assist the parties in identifying disputed issues, reducing misunderstandings, implementing parenting plans, complying with court orders, and settling parenting disputes.

• Under Texas Family Code § 153.6061(b), appointment of a parenting facilitator does not divest the trial court of its exclusive jurisdiction over conservatorship, support, possession, and access, or its management and control of the suit.

• Error preservation remains essential. A party must make a timely request, objection, or motion in the trial court.

• Under the invited-error doctrine, a party may not request a particular ruling or language below and then complain on appeal when the trial court adopts that request.

Application

The court began with the MSA-compliance issue because it framed the statutory complaint. Father argued that the facilitator’s authority should have been limited to determining whether he could move from Phase One to Phase Two, relying on the narrower wording embedded in the Phase One possession provision. The Dallas court rejected that reading because it isolated one clause and ignored the MSA’s separate, specifically captioned “Parenting Facilitator” section. Read as a whole, the MSA unambiguously provided that the parenting facilitator would determine when Father could move to the next phase of the step-up schedule. Since the schedule had three phases, the broader language naturally applied to advancement beyond Phase Two as well.

That reading allowed the court to conclude that the decree’s language did not add terms, significantly alter the MSA, or undermine party intent. The decree simply implemented the broader language already found in the MSA. The court further noted that Father had proposed nearly identical language in his own draft decree, which independently weakened his position under the invited-error doctrine.

On the statutory issue, the court focused on the limiting language included in the decree. The decree did authorize the parenting facilitator to determine whether Father could advance within the step-up schedule and whether he was under psychiatric care, following recommendations, and taking medication as prescribed. But the decree also expressly preserved the trial court’s exclusive jurisdiction over conservatorship, support, possession, and access. That was the key structural safeguard. In the court’s view, the facilitator’s role operated within the existing possession framework and did not supplant the court’s ultimate authority over possession or access.

The opinion reflects a practical distinction Texas family lawyers often litigate: there is a difference between delegating the court’s core adjudicative power and authorizing a neutral professional to make implementation-related determinations within a court-ordered framework. The decree survived because it preserved that distinction on its face.

Holding

The court held that the divorce decree complied with the mediated settlement agreement. When the MSA was read as a whole, its plain language authorized the parenting facilitator to determine when Father could move to the next phase of the three-step possession schedule, not merely from Phase One to Phase Two. Accordingly, the decree’s Phase Two-to-Phase Three language did not add terms, materially alter the agreement, or frustrate party intent.

The court also held that the decree did not violate Texas Family Code §§ 153.606 and 153.6061 by authorizing the parenting facilitator to determine when Father could move to the next phase of the step-up schedule. The decisive feature was that the decree expressly preserved the trial court’s exclusive jurisdiction over conservatorship, support, possession, and access. Because the decree did not divest the court of its authority, the facilitator’s assigned role was permissible.

Finally, the court treated the decree’s statutory-savings language—that appointment of the parenting facilitator did not divest the court of authority—as a clarification consistent with the statute rather than an improper addition to the MSA. That language reinforced the decree’s validity rather than changing the parties’ bargain.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, In re G.H.G. is a drafting case as much as it is a statutory-construction case. It supports the use of step-up possession schedules in high-conflict or clinically sensitive cases where progression depends on objective or quasi-objective implementation findings by a parenting facilitator. That can be especially valuable in cases involving supervised reunification, psychiatric treatment, substance-related monitoring, domestic-violence protective concerns, or prolonged estrangement between a parent and child.

The opinion also shows how to draft these provisions without crossing into impermissible delegation. The safer structure is to define the possession phases in the decree itself, identify measurable progression criteria, authorize the parenting facilitator to determine whether those criteria have been met, and then expressly state that the facilitator’s appointment does not divest the court of exclusive jurisdiction. That formulation places the facilitator in an implementation and compliance-monitoring role rather than in the role of adjudicating possession.

The case is equally important on the MSA side. If the MSA contains both specific phase language and a broader facilitator provision, appellate courts are likely to read the agreement as a whole and harmonize the clauses rather than adopt a cramped reading from one subsection. Practitioners who intend a facilitator’s role to be limited to only one transition point need to say so expressly. If the intent is broader, this case provides support for enforcing that broader language.

The preservation lesson is just as significant. A party challenging decree language must make a precise objection to the final decree actually signed. And if counsel has submitted substantially similar language in a proposed decree, that fact may become fatal on appeal. In difficult MSA implementation disputes, trial counsel should build a record distinguishing proposed compromise language from a client’s actual legal position.

Checklists

Drafting a Valid Step-Up Possession Provision

• Define each possession phase in the decree with specificity.
• State the objective or observable conditions required for progression between phases.
• Identify the parenting facilitator’s role as determining compliance with those criteria, not setting independent possession terms.
• Include express language that the appointment does not divest the court of exclusive jurisdiction over conservatorship, support, possession, or access.
• Tie the facilitator’s authority to implementation of the court-ordered parenting plan.
• Avoid wording that suggests the facilitator may modify possession at will.

Drafting the MSA to Avoid Future Decree Fights

• Use one consistent formulation for the parenting facilitator’s authority throughout the MSA.
• If the facilitator’s authority applies to all phase transitions, say so expressly.
• If the authority applies only to a single transition, limit it by phase number and transition point.
• Reconcile any specific phase language with any global “Parenting Facilitator” section.
• Define medication-compliance, treatment-compliance, and reporting obligations clearly.
• Consider whether releases for therapist, psychiatrist, or supervisor communications should be mandatory and time-limited.

Preserving Error for Appeal

• Object to the exact decree language signed by the trial court, not merely earlier drafts or arbitration rulings.
• File a written objection or motion to modify that identifies the challenged provision and the legal basis for the complaint.
• Ensure the reporter’s record captures the objection and the trial court’s ruling.
• File a motion for new trial if necessary to sharpen complaints about variance from the MSA or improper delegation.
• Distinguish any alternative or fallback language you offer from your primary legal position.

Avoiding Invited Error

• Review all proposed decree language for consistency with anticipated appellate positions.
• Do not submit language that materially mirrors wording you later intend to attack.
• If proposing language as a compromise, say so clearly on the record.
• Mark proposed decrees and redlines carefully to show what was accepted, rejected, or conditionally offered.
• Confirm that the record does not suggest the court was merely granting your requested relief.

Litigating Parenting Facilitator Authority

• Frame the facilitator’s function as monitoring, implementation, and compliance support under Family Code § 153.6061.
• Emphasize that the court—not the facilitator—retains exclusive authority over conservatorship and possession.
• Use the decree to cabin the facilitator’s authority within predetermined possession parameters.
• Avoid authorizing the facilitator to create new possession schedules or adjudicate disputed legal rights.
• If challenging facilitator authority, focus on language that actually transfers adjudicative discretion away from the court.

Citation

In the Interest of G.H.G. and H.R.G., No. 05-25-00349-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 20, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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