Foster Parents Don’t Need 12 Months to Intervene: Houston Appeals Court Opens Another Door to Termination and Adoption | In re I.H. (2026)

In the Interest of I.H. a/k/a O.G., a Child, No. 14-26-00463-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 20, 2026, mem. op.)

On appeal from the 306th District Court, Galveston County, Texas

Synopsis

Can foster parents intervene in a Texas child-protection case, seek termination of parental rights, and pursue adoption even though the child lived with them for less than the 12 months ordinarily required for foster-parent standing? And can they prevail when the Department of Family and Protective Services itself opposes terminating the parent’s rights?

Yes, under the circumstances presented in this case.

In In re I.H., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict terminating a father’s parental rights and appointing the child’s former foster parents as permanent managing conservators—even though the Department favored preserving the father’s rights and placing the child with a paternal relative.

The opinion delivers three significant holdings:

1. Foster-parent standing: Texas Family Code § 102.005(5) provides an independent avenue for foster parents to establish standing to seek termination and adoption based on substantial past contact with the child, even when they cannot satisfy the 12-month requirement of § 102.003(a)(12).
2. Endangerment under Ground E: The father’s criminal history, evidence of continued drug involvement, refusal to submit to drug testing, failure to complete services, and knowledge of the mother’s drug use during pregnancy collectively supported a finding of an endangering course of conduct under § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
3. Best interest: The evidence supporting the foster parents’ proposed permanent placement, considered alongside the father’s circumstances and concerns about the long-term stability of the relative placement, was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s best-interest finding.

The first holding is particularly consequential. A foster parent who lacks standing to file a general SAPCR may nonetheless qualify to seek termination and adoption under a different statutory provision.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters beyond the relatively narrow world of foster-care litigation.

First, it illustrates why standing must be analyzed by reference to the specific relief requested, rather than simply the petitioner’s relationship to the child. The Family Code establishes different standing requirements for different kinds of SAPCRs, and a litigant who cannot satisfy one provision may qualify under another.

Second, the case demonstrates that the Department does not control the ultimate disposition of a child-protection case once another party with standing intervenes. The Department sought relative placement and opposed termination of the father’s rights at trial. The foster parents disagreed, requested a jury, and ultimately prevailed.

Third, it reinforces the importance of developing evidence of a parent’s conduct over time. The appellate court did not rely upon a single criminal conviction, missed drug test, or failure to attend parenting classes. It examined the evidence collectively to determine whether the jury could reasonably find a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct.

Finally, the opinion illustrates a recurring tension in Texas conservatorship litigation: the preference for maintaining familial relationships must be considered alongside the child’s need for safety, stability, and permanence. A relative placement’s apparent adequacy does not necessarily defeat a finding that termination of a parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Olivia, as the appellate court called the child, was born in October 2024. Her mother admitted using methamphetamine and cocaine through the day of delivery. Olivia tested positive for drugs, experienced withdrawal symptoms, and required medical attention.

The Department obtained emergency possession and placed Olivia with foster parents B.G.W. and B.H., where she remained for approximately 346 days.

At first, paternity was uncertain. D.G., the alleged father, declined to participate in services until genetic testing confirmed he was Olivia’s father.

After paternity was established, the Department identified D.G.’s aunt, C.M., as a potential kinship placement. The Department completed its placement assessment and sought to transfer Olivia to the aunt’s home.

The trial court approved the transfer.

That was not the end of the matter.

The former foster parents had developed a strong relationship with Olivia and wanted to adopt her. They intervened in the Department’s pending SAPCR, requesting termination of both parents’ rights and adoption.

The Department moved to strike their intervention, and the father joined that motion. The trial court denied the motion, allowing the foster parents to remain parties.

The foster parents requested a jury trial.

Meanwhile, the mother executed an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights, and the trial court terminated those rights. The paternal aunt also intervened, requesting termination and adoption.

By the time of trial, the parties were advancing substantially different outcomes.

The Department advocated for the paternal aunt to become Olivia’s permanent managing conservator, without terminating the father’s parental rights.

The father supported that arrangement. He acknowledged that his severe congestive heart failure and other circumstances prevented him from personally caring for Olivia, but he wanted her to remain with his aunt.

The former foster parents sought termination of the father’s rights and adoption.

Evidence showed that the father had an extensive criminal history, including convictions for indecency with a child, arson, burglary, drug possession, and failure to register as a sex offender. He also had a pending cocaine-possession charge.

He had not completed parenting classes, had unsuccessfully completed individual therapy, and had not submitted to a single requested drug test. Although he attributed some missed tests to his frequent hospitalizations, he acknowledged that he sometimes simply did not want to comply.

On the other hand, evidence established that Olivia was receiving appropriate care while living with her paternal aunt. Department and CASA witnesses reported no current safety concerns in that placement. The aunt had become a licensed foster parent, had prepared her home for Olivia, and was participating in the child’s ongoing medical and developmental care.

The former foster parents presented evidence of their own successful care of Olivia, the child’s bond with their family, and their ability and willingness to provide a permanent home.

The jury found that the father had engaged in endangering conduct under § 161.001(b)(1)(E), determined that termination was in Olivia’s best interest, and named the former foster parents as permanent managing conservators.

The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict.

The father appealed.

Issues Decided

The father raised three appellate issues.

Issue One: Standing to intervene. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to strike the foster parents’ intervention when they had not cared for Olivia for the 12 months required under § 102.003(a)(12)?

Issue Two: Ground E endangerment. Was the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support termination under § 161.001(b)(1)(E)?

Issue Three: Best interest. Was the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s determination that termination of the father’s parental rights was in Olivia’s best interest?

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected all three challenges and affirmed.

Rules Applied

1. Foster-parent standing: §§ 102.003(a)(12) and 102.005(5)

The father’s standing argument centered on § 102.003(a)(12), which, under the version of the statute applicable to this proceeding, afforded standing to a foster parent when the Department had placed the child in the foster parent’s home for at least 12 months, ending not more than 90 days before the petition was filed.

Because the foster parents had cared for Olivia for approximately 346 days, they did not satisfy that 12-month requirement.

But that was not their only asserted basis for standing.

They pleaded standing under § 102.005(3) and (5). The appellate court focused on § 102.005(5), which authorized an adult whom the court determined to have had substantial past contact with the child sufficient to warrant standing to bring a suit seeking adoption or termination joined with adoption.

The father argued that § 102.003(a)(12) was the more specific provision applicable to foster parents and therefore controlled over the general reference to adults in § 102.005(5).

According to his argument, allowing foster parents to use § 102.005 would effectively eliminate the Legislature’s 12-month requirement.

The court rejected that interpretation.

The two statutes address different categories of litigation. Section 102.003 creates general standing to bring a SAPCR, while § 102.005 establishes standing for the narrower category of suits seeking adoption or termination joined with adoption.

Nothing in § 102.005(5) excludes foster parents from its coverage.

The court reasoned that the Legislature could have excluded foster parents expressly if that had been its intention. The judiciary could not insert such an exception into the statute.

The Fourteenth Court also relied on decisions from the Waco and Beaumont courts of appeals recognizing alternative statutory avenues for foster-parent standing: In re K.T.R., No. 10-22-00219-CV, 2022 WL 17834491 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 21, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.), and In re C.E.L., No. 09-21-00294-CV, 2022 WL 619670 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 3, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

The resulting rule is important:

A foster parent need not necessarily satisfy the 12-month requirement of § 102.003(a)(12) to pursue termination and adoption when standing exists independently under § 102.005(5).

That does not mean every foster parent automatically qualifies. The alternative statutory basis still requires substantial past contact sufficient to warrant standing, and the relief requested must fall within § 102.005.

The court also declined to address the father’s separate reference to § 102.004(b-1), concluding that § 102.005(5) independently established standing.

2. Endangerment under § 161.001(b)(1)(E)

Ground E authorizes termination upon clear and convincing evidence that the parent engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct, endangering the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

The endangerment must arise from the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act.

Critically, Ground E requires more than an isolated mistake. It contemplates a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct.

The court relied on In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied), for several important principles:

• Conduct before or after the child’s birth may establish the necessary course of conduct.
• The conduct need not be directed specifically at the child.
• Actual injury to the child is not required.
• Criminal conduct, instability, and substance abuse may support an endangerment finding.
• A parent’s efforts—or lack of efforts—to improve parenting skills may be relevant.

A particularly important evidentiary rule concerns missed drug tests.

The court cited T.D. v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, 683 S.W.3d 901, 914 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.), recognizing that the factfinder may infer that missed drug tests would have been positive.

The inference is permissive, not conclusive. But in an appropriate evidentiary record, repeated failures to submit to testing can become substantive evidence supporting endangerment.

The court also relied on In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749–50 (Tex. 2022), for the proposition that a parent’s knowledge of the other parent’s drug use during pregnancy, coupled with a failure to attempt to protect the unborn child, can contribute to an endangerment finding.

3. Best interest and the Holley factors

The second statutory requirement for termination is clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(2).

The court applied the familiar nonexclusive factors from Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976), including the child’s present and future needs, potential dangers, parenting abilities, available assistance, proposed placement plans, and stability.

The court emphasized that the best-interest inquiry focuses on the child rather than the parent.

Importantly, not every factor must be established, and no single factor necessarily controls the analysis.

A court may consider the entire evidentiary record, including circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences, when evaluating whether the factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Application

The standing question: 346 days was enough for this kind of lawsuit

The standing analysis is the opinion’s most significant contribution to Texas family law jurisprudence.

The foster parents lacked the 12 months required under the general foster-parent standing provision. But their intervention requested termination and adoption, and they relied on the substantial-past-contact language of § 102.005(5).

The father sought to make the 12-month requirement controlling in all foster-parent litigation.

The appellate court refused.

The distinction between the two statutory provisions preserved the operation of both. Section 102.003(a)(12) continued to govern the broader class of SAPCRs, while § 102.005(5) provided an independent basis for the narrower termination-and-adoption proceeding.

The significance is not that 346 days constitutes a new bright-line test for substantial past contact. The court announced no such minimum.

Rather, the length-of-placement requirement under one standing provision did not disqualify these foster parents from proceeding under another provision that applied to their requested relief.

That distinction should be central to both pleading and attacking standing.

The Ground E question: the evidence was cumulative

The father’s appeal challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the endangerment finding.

The appellate court considered multiple categories of evidence.

His criminal history included serious offenses, notably indecency with a child, and he faced a pending controlled-substance charge. The court treated his criminal conduct as relevant to the instability and uncertainty that could endanger the child.

The evidence concerning the pending charge, combined with testimony that he knew he would be a father while the mother was pregnant, permitted the jury to draw unfavorable inferences about continued drug involvement.

His refusal to submit to drug tests was also significant. He had received notices to test, and caseworkers testified that missed tests were treated as positive results.

His explanation that hospitalization prevented compliance with some testing did not address every missed test. More damagingly, he acknowledged that on some occasions he simply did not want to participate.

The jury was entitled to resolve conflicts in the testimony and infer continued illegal substance use from the missed tests.

The father also knew the mother was using drugs during pregnancy. Although he maintained that he was uncertain of paternity, another witness testified that he had acknowledged impending fatherhood before Olivia was born.

The jury could credit that testimony and consider his failure to intervene to protect the unborn child.

Finally, he had not attended the parenting classes required by his service plan and had not successfully completed individual therapy.

The appellate court concluded that this combined evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the Ground E finding.

The important distinction is that the court did not hold that failing a service plan, missing a drug test, or having a criminal conviction automatically establishes endangerment. It held that the particular record permitted the jury to find the requisite course of conduct.

The best-interest question: a safe relative placement was not dispositive

The best-interest analysis presents another important feature of the opinion.

Evidence supported the conclusion that Olivia was appropriately cared for in her paternal aunt’s home.

Department employees had approved the placement. CASA’s position had evolved in favor of the relative placement. Witnesses described the home as appropriate and reported no existing safety concerns. The aunt was providing necessary therapies and maintaining supervised visits between Olivia and her father.

Those facts were favorable to the father and aunt.

But they did not compel the jury to reject termination.

The court examined Olivia’s developmental and medical needs, her relationship with the former foster parents, the father’s limited capacity to provide care, and the competing plans for long-term stability.

The former foster parents had cared for Olivia for nearly a year, demonstrated an ability to meet her needs, and had an extended family available to provide assistance.

Although Olivia had bonded with the aunt as well, there was evidence of speech regression after the placement change.

The court also considered concerns about the aunt’s ability to provide long-term care, including chronic health issues and the availability of backup caregivers. The record contained conflicting evidence on those points, and the court did not treat the aunt’s health conditions as establishing that she was unable to care for Olivia.

Rather, those circumstances were considered as part of the overall permanency analysis.

The court viewed the stability-of-home factor as neutral, recognizing favorable and unfavorable evidence concerning both placements.

Nevertheless, the father’s endangering conduct, the child’s ongoing needs, and the foster parents’ demonstrated ability to offer long-term care supported the best-interest determination.

The appellate court concluded that a reasonable jury could form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in Olivia’s best interest, and that the contrary evidence was not so significant as to render the finding factually insufficient.

Holding

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination judgment.

Specifically, it held that:

First, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to strike the foster parents’ intervention because § 102.005(5) provided an independent basis for their standing to pursue termination and adoption.

Second, legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the jury’s Ground E endangerment finding under § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

Third, legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the jury’s determination that termination was in Olivia’s best interest under § 161.001(b)(2).

The court overruled all three appellate issues.

Practical Application

1. Do not confuse general SAPCR standing with termination-and-adoption standing

The principal practice lesson concerns statutory standing.

When a foster parent seeks to intervene, counsel should identify precisely what relief the intervenor requests and which statute supplies standing for that relief.

A motion to strike premised exclusively on failure to satisfy § 102.003(a)(12) may be ineffective when the intervenor has pleaded a viable independent basis under § 102.005.

For counsel representing foster parents, the opinion supports pleading the specific termination-and-adoption standing provision when the facts support it. Allegations and evidence should address substantial past contact with the child and the relief actually requested.

For counsel opposing intervention, a complete standing analysis requires more than counting months. It requires addressing every statutory basis actually asserted.

A practical warning: The court applied the Family Code as it existed before September 1, 2025, because the intervention was filed August 18, 2025. The Legislature amended relevant provisions effective September 1, 2025. Practitioners must independently examine the statutory text applicable to their own proceedings rather than assume the former version controls a newly filed case.

2. The Department’s recommendation does not eliminate a private intervenor’s claim

At trial, the Department was not seeking termination of the father’s parental rights. Its preferred result was permanent conservatorship with the aunt.

But the Department’s position did not foreclose the foster parents’ independently pleaded claims.

This matters when evaluating trial strategy. Counsel should not assume that agreement with the Department necessarily resolves the litigation if another party with standing is pursuing different relief.

Likewise, counsel representing an intervenor must be prepared to establish the statutory predicates for termination and best interest through admissible evidence, without relying on the Department to advance those claims.

3. Treat missed drug tests as an evidentiary problem, not merely a compliance problem

Repeatedly missing drug tests creates more than an unfavorable impression.

Under the authorities applied in this opinion, a factfinder may infer that missed tests would have been positive.

That makes contemporaneous documentation essential when a legitimate medical, logistical, or other obstacle prevents testing.

A parent who is hospitalized should be prepared to substantiate the dates of hospitalization, the timing of testing notices, communications with the testing provider, and any requests for accommodations.

There is an important difference between showing that compliance was impossible and merely explaining after the fact why it did not occur.

The distinction becomes especially difficult when the parent admits that at least some missed tests resulted from an unwillingness to participate.

4. Address the entire course of conduct under Ground E

Termination litigators should develop a chronology that extends beyond isolated incidents.

That chronology may include criminal conduct, arrests, substance-use evidence, service-plan participation, parenting efforts, and conduct during pregnancy.

Counsel defending against a Ground E allegation should identify what each piece of evidence actually establishes and whether the evidence collectively demonstrates the required voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct.

Conversely, counsel seeking termination should avoid simply presenting a list of unfavorable facts without connecting them to the statutory endangerment standard.

5. A relative placement requires a long-term permanency presentation

A family placement may be entirely safe and appropriate at the time of trial yet still face an adverse best-interest finding.

When advocating for kinship placement, evidence should address not only current living conditions but the child’s future needs, continued access to services, caregiver capacity, and realistic contingency plans.

In this case, witnesses described the aunt’s home as appropriate, and the court acknowledged that favorable evidence.

But the jury also heard evidence raising questions about future stability and available support.

Practitioners should prepare the kinship-placement case with the same attention to long-term permanency that would be given to a prospective adoptive placement.

6. Distinguish the child’s best interest from the parent’s rights

The father did not seek to become Olivia’s primary caregiver. His proposed outcome was to preserve his parental rights while the child remained with his aunt.

That position was relevant to the competing disposition proposals, but it did not eliminate the statutory grounds for termination or resolve the best-interest inquiry.

Counsel should separately develop the evidence concerning the parent’s conduct, the appropriateness of the proposed conservatorship arrangement, and whether termination is in the child’s best interest.

A suitable caregiver does not necessarily cure the legal consequences of the parent’s own endangering conduct.

Checklists

Evaluate Standing Before Filing or Opposing Intervention

• Identify the specific relief sought in the live pleading.
• Determine whether the pleading invokes general SAPCR standing or termination-and-adoption standing.
• Analyze all statutory standing provisions potentially applicable to the requested relief.
• For § 102.005(5), develop evidence of substantial past contact sufficient to warrant standing.
• Determine whether standing existed when the intervention was filed.
• Review the effective date and applicability of any intervening statutory amendments.
• File any motion to strike with sufficient time to obtain a ruling.
• Address each pleaded basis for standing rather than relying solely on the 12-month foster-parent requirement.
• Preserve the relevant pleadings, evidence, and rulings for appellate review.

Develop the Ground E Record

• Identify the particular acts and omissions alleged to constitute endangerment.
• Prepare a chronology of relevant conduct before and after the child’s birth.
• Distinguish isolated incidents from evidence of a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct.
• Obtain admissible evidence of criminal history and relevant substance-use conduct.
• Determine what the parent knew about drug use during pregnancy and what protective action, if any, was taken.
• Document drug-testing notices, completed tests, missed tests, and explanations for noncompliance.
• Investigate and corroborate medical or logistical reasons for missed services.
• Address parenting classes, counseling, evaluations, and other efforts to improve parenting capacity.
• Connect the evidence to physical or emotional endangerment rather than treating noncompliance as a substitute for the statutory elements.

Prepare the Best-Interest Case

• Identify the child’s current and anticipated physical, emotional, medical, and developmental needs.
• Develop evidence of the child’s relationships with current and former caregivers.
• Evaluate each proposed placement’s ability to meet continuing needs.
• Address the stability and suitability of the proposed homes.
• Identify the available extended-family and community support.
• Present credible plans for caregiver illness, emergencies, or other disruptions.
• Account for the child’s need for permanency.
• Develop favorable and unfavorable evidence under the Holley factors.
• Address the parent’s proposed conservatorship arrangement separately from the statutory predicate for termination.
• Avoid assuming that an appropriate current placement conclusively resolves best interest.

Preserve the Appellate Record

• Obtain express rulings on standing and intervention disputes.
• Preserve all relevant intervention pleadings and motions to strike.
• Request the necessary reporter’s and clerk’s records.
• Identify each termination ground submitted and found.
• Preserve legal- and factual-sufficiency complaints through the appropriate procedures.
• Analyze the evidence under the clear-and-convincing burden.
• Address Ground E and best interest as separate requirements.
• Account for conflicting evidence under the appropriate appellate standards.
• Identify the statutory version applicable to the proceeding.
• Review the final judgment and the specific issues actually presented on appeal.

Citation

In re I.H. a/k/a O.G., No. 14-26-00463-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 20, 2026, mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full memorandum opinion.