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Family Violence Evidence Supports Protective Order | Stanley v. Growden (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Stanley v. Growden, 10-25-00008-CV, November 12, 2026.

On appeal from County Court of Freestone County, Texas

Synopsis

The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed a protective order because legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that family violence occurred. Physical contact need not produce bodily injury: intentionally pushing a household member may constitute assault—and therefore family violence—when the actor knows or should reasonably believe the contact will be regarded as offensive or provocative.

Relevance to Family Law

Stanley matters beyond the immediate protective-order proceeding. A finding of family violence can materially affect conservatorship, possession, access, and safety provisions in a SAPCR or divorce under Texas Family Code § 153.004, and the conduct supporting a protective order may also justify temporary restraints, exclusive use of a residence, supervised possession, or restrictions on communications. Although a protective order does not adjudicate property title, exclusion from a shared residence can significantly alter the practical posture of divorce and property litigation. The opinion also reinforces the importance of developing a detailed evidentiary record: conduct characterized by the respondent as “mere pushing” may satisfy the statutory definition when considered with blocking movement, aggressive confrontation, prior conduct, and the witnesses’ resulting fear.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Jessica Growden applied for a family-violence protective order against Sean Stanley after an October 13, 2024 incident at the home where Stanley, Growden, Growden’s children, her adult daughter Isabel, and Isabel’s boyfriend, Robert Perry, had been living. Growden testified that Stanley had anger issues and had previously punched walls, thrown objects, and yelled at her children.

On the evening at issue, Perry encountered Stanley pacing and scoffing inside the home. According to Perry, Stanley prevented him from leaving the laundry room, screamed directly into his face, and moved toward the doorway whenever Perry attempted to leave. Perry initially tried to defuse the confrontation by telling Stanley that he did not want to participate in the dispute and wanted to return to his room.

Stanley briefly walked away but returned and began pushing Perry farther into the laundry room with his body. Perry testified that Stanley physically contacted him and continued pushing into him. Perry then put his hands near Stanley’s shoulders and neck and pushed Stanley out of the laundry room in an effort to escape the confrontation. He also called for Isabel to contact law enforcement.

Isabel heard the yelling and saw Stanley and Perry confronting one another. After Perry asked her to call the police, she returned to her room for her phone. When she later heard scuffling, she retrieved a pistol because she believed the encounter had become physical and thought she might need to protect Perry. She entered the living room with the weapon pointed at Stanley but holstered it when she saw that the men were separating fighting dogs rather than fighting each other.

A Fairfield police officer responded to the incident. After speaking with the participants, the officer suggested that Stanley leave the residence. Stanley refused and told the officer to arrest him. The officer arrested Stanley for family violence, although he acknowledged that Stanley would not have been arrested that evening if he had agreed to leave.

Growden testified that Stanley’s arrest left her afraid and that she did not want him to return home. Nevertheless, Stanley returned the following day with his parents, who came to confront her, and he remained in the residence. Although Growden and Stanley slept in the same bed that night, Growden testified that they did not reconcile and that she remained silent because she was afraid of him.

On October 15, Growden gave Stanley written notice to leave the home and filed her protective-order application. Stanley did not leave until October 17, after he was served with a temporary protective order. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that family violence had occurred and rendered the protective order.

Issues Decided

  • Whether the trial court’s finding that family violence occurred should be reviewed for abuse of discretion or under legal- and factual-sufficiency standards.

  • Whether legally sufficient evidence supported the family-violence finding required by Texas Family Code §§ 81.001 and 85.001.

  • Whether the finding was factually sufficient when the entire record—including evidence contrary to the finding—was considered.

  • Whether Stanley’s physical contact with Perry could constitute family violence even though Stanley characterized the conduct as “mere pushing.”

Rules Applied

Texas Family Code § 81.001 requires a court to render a protective order as provided by § 85.001 when the court finds that family violence has occurred.

Texas Family Code § 71.004(1) defines family violence to include an act by one family or household member against another that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault. The definition also encompasses a threat that reasonably places the other person in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault. Defensive measures taken to protect oneself are excluded.

Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a)(3) provides that assault includes intentionally or knowingly causing physical contact with another person when the actor knows or should reasonably believe the other person will regard the contact as offensive or provocative. Accordingly, proof of bodily injury is not always necessary to establish an assault that qualifies as family violence.

The Tenth Court applied legal- and factual-sufficiency review to the family-violence finding rather than treating the entire inquiry solely as an abuse-of-discretion question. The court relied on its prior decision in Warren v. Earley and recognized that Texas intermediate appellate courts have not always framed the standard of review uniformly.

Under In re A.C., evidence is legally sufficient when, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and considering undisputed contrary evidence, a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. The reviewing court assumes that the factfinder resolved disputed evidence in favor of the finding.

For factual sufficiency, the appellate court examines the entire record and weighs the evidence supporting and contradicting the finding. Under Warren and Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, the finding may be set aside only when it is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.

Application

Stanley attempted to narrow the evidentiary record to Perry’s testimony about physical contact and argued that blocking Perry’s path and pushing him did not rise to the level of family violence. The court rejected the premise that “mere pushing” is categorically insufficient.

Perry’s testimony established more than incidental contact. Stanley confronted him in a confined area, screamed in his face, prevented him from leaving, moved toward the exit whenever Perry attempted to pass, and then used his body to push Perry farther into the laundry room. From those circumstances, the trial court could reasonably determine that Stanley intentionally or knowingly made physical contact while knowing, or having reason to know, that Perry would regard it as offensive or provocative. That conduct falls within the Penal Code’s definition of assault and, when committed against a household member, can constitute family violence under Family Code § 71.004.

The surrounding evidence reinforced the trial court’s assessment. Perry attempted to disengage and requested police intervention. Isabel perceived the disturbance as sufficiently serious to call 9-1-1 and initially believed physical force was being used. Growden described Stanley’s history of anger-related conduct, testified that she feared him after the incident, and sought both his removal from the home and a protective order. Stanley’s return to the residence and refusal to leave until served with a temporary order also supplied context for the trial court’s evaluation of the witnesses and the need for judicial protection.

The evidence contained potentially adverse facts, including Perry’s prior altercation with other members of the household, Isabel’s display of a firearm, Growden’s decision to remain in the home and share a bed with Stanley after his release, and the officer’s testimony that Stanley would not have been arrested had he agreed to leave. Those circumstances did not require reversal. The trial court was entitled to resolve conflicts, assess credibility, and determine the weight to assign each fact. Growden’s continued presence in the home did not conclusively negate her testimony that she was afraid, particularly because she explained why she remained silent and promptly pursued written notice and protective relief.

Holding

The Tenth Court held that the trial court’s finding of family violence was subject to legal- and factual-sufficiency review. It declined to evaluate the essential finding solely under an abuse-of-discretion standard merely because a protective order resembles a civil injunction.

The court further held that the evidence was legally sufficient. A reasonable factfinder could determine that Stanley’s deliberate physical contact with Perry constituted assault and therefore family violence. Proof of physical injury was not required because offensive or provocative physical contact may satisfy Penal Code § 22.01(a)(3).

Finally, the court held that the evidence was factually sufficient. After considering the complete record, including evidence favorable to Stanley, the court concluded that the family-violence finding was not so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. The protective order was affirmed.

Practical Application

For protective-order applicants, Stanley demonstrates why counsel should not describe the case only in terms of whether the respondent caused an injury. The record should address the nature of the contact, the respondent’s intent or knowledge, whether the applicant or household member regarded the contact as offensive or provocative, whether movement was restricted, and what immediately preceded and followed the contact.

For respondents, an appellate argument that conduct amounted to “mere pushing” is unlikely to succeed when the trial record shows deliberate contact, confinement, intimidation, or escalation. Counsel should instead develop evidence addressing intent, accident, defensive conduct, witness bias, inconsistencies, and whether the parties were members of the statutorily defined family, household, or dating relationship.

In divorce and SAPCR litigation, practitioners should anticipate that the same episode may have consequences under both the protective-order statutes and the conservatorship provisions of the Family Code. Evidence should be developed with later custody litigation in mind, including the children’s presence, exposure to the confrontation, safety risks, law-enforcement involvement, and the feasibility of structured possession or supervised access.

When presenting or defending against a sufficiency challenge, appellate preservation matters. Obtain express findings where appropriate, ensure that all exhibits are admitted, secure a complete reporter’s record, and tie the evidence to each statutory element. Because the appellate court defers to the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts, the evidentiary hearing—not the appeal—is ordinarily the critical point for winning the credibility contest.

Checklists

Building the Applicant’s Family-Violence Record

  • Identify the qualifying family, household, or dating relationship.
  • Establish who lived in the residence and during what period.
  • Describe each act of physical contact with specificity.
  • Explain whether the respondent blocked an exit or restricted movement.
  • Elicit testimony showing why the contact was offensive or provocative.
  • Develop evidence of threats or fear of imminent physical harm.
  • Distinguish defensive conduct from the respondent’s initiating conduct.
  • Present the sequence of events rather than relying on labels such as “assault” or “abuse.”
  • Offer photographs, recordings, messages, 9-1-1 audio, body-camera footage, and police reports when admissible.
  • Explain conduct that the respondent may characterize as inconsistent with fear, including remaining in or returning to the residence.

Defending the Respondent

  • Test whether the applicant proved a qualifying statutory relationship.
  • Separate accidental contact from intentional or knowing contact.
  • Develop evidence that the contact was defensive or undertaken to disengage.
  • Examine whether the witness’s account changed across statements, pleadings, and testimony.
  • Address prior conflicts, bias, motive, and the physical layout of the scene.
  • Avoid relying exclusively on the absence of bodily injury.
  • Explain post-incident communications or continued cohabitation without overstating their significance.
  • Present admissible evidence supporting alternative explanations for law-enforcement action.
  • Request findings and preserve objections to excluded evidence.
  • Ensure that the reporter’s record contains all testimony relevant to a later sufficiency challenge.

Preparing for Related Divorce or SAPCR Litigation

  • Evaluate the effect of the evidence under Texas Family Code § 153.004.
  • Determine whether children witnessed or heard the confrontation.
  • Assess whether temporary conservatorship or possession restrictions are warranted.
  • Consider supervised possession, neutral exchanges, and communication protocols.
  • Coordinate protective-order terms with existing possession orders.
  • Address exclusive use of the residence without treating possession as an adjudication of title.
  • Preserve evidence for later temporary-orders and final-trial proceedings.
  • Identify inconsistent factual positions across the protective-order, divorce, and SAPCR pleadings.
  • Advise the client regarding compliance with all no-contact, exclusion, firearm, and communication provisions.
  • Calendar expiration dates and any deadlines for modification, extension, or appeal.

Preserving a Sufficiency Challenge

  • Make a complete record of all testimony and exhibits.
  • Secure rulings on objections and offers of proof.
  • Identify the precise statutory element allegedly unsupported by the evidence.
  • Address both supporting evidence and undisputed contrary evidence.
  • Frame legal and factual sufficiency as distinct appellate arguments.
  • Account for the trial court’s authority to resolve credibility disputes.
  • Avoid characterizing deliberate physical contact as legally insignificant without addressing Penal Code § 22.01(a)(3).
  • Challenge any necessary implied findings when no written findings were requested or entered.
  • Confirm appellate deadlines applicable to the protective order.
  • Verify that the clerk’s and reporter’s records include all temporary orders, applications, returns of service, and hearing materials.

Citation

Stanley v. Growden, No. 10-25-00008-CV, slip op. (Tex. App.—Waco Nov. 12, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion in Stanley v. Growden.

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Tom Daley is a board-certified family law attorney with extensive experience practicing across the United States, primarily in Texas. He represents clients in all aspects of family law, including negotiation, settlement, litigation, trial, and appeals.