Texas Supreme Court Remands for New Trial After Overturning Admission of Former Judge’s Testimony in Informal Marriage Dispute

In re Estate of Guadalupe Lopez, Sr., Deceased, 24-0315, November 07, 2025.

On appeal from Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas

Synopsis

The Texas Supreme Court held that admitting expert testimony on the existence of an informal (common-law) marriage was an abuse of discretion where the issue was within the ordinary juror’s common knowledge, and that the error was harmful. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for a new trial.

Relevance to Family Law

This decision directly controls proof strategy in disputes alleging informal marriage in probate, divorce, custody, and property contexts. It tightens limits on expert testimony about legal status conclusions that jurors can resolve from ordinary facts, and it cautions against using former judges or similarly influential witnesses to opine on legal presumptions or ultimate marital-status questions.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

After Lopez Sr.’s death, his son obtained independent administration and an heirship determination. Elvira Gonzalez later filed a bill of review, asserting she was Lopez Sr.’s common-law wife and thus an heir. The trial court deferred ruling on the bill of review until a jury decided whether an informal marriage existed.

Gonzalez offered deposition testimony from Alicia York, a former district court judge, who repeatedly opined that the three statutory elements of informal marriage were met. Over objection, the trial court admitted that testimony; the jury found marriage, and the court granted Gonzalez a share of the estate.

On appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed; the Texas Supreme Court granted review focused on admissibility of the expert testimony and its harmfulness.

Issues Decided

The Supreme Court decided (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting expert testimony on whether an informal marriage existed when the issue was within the common knowledge of jurors under TEX. R. EVID. 702; and (2) whether any error in admission was harmful such that reversal and a new trial were required.

Rules Applied

The Court applied Texas Rule of Evidence 702 and the established standard that expert testimony is admissible only when specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact beyond ordinary juror competency (K-Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt; In re J.P.B.; Dallas Morning News v. Hall). It relied on Family Code § 2.401(a)(2) to identify the elements of informal marriage (agreement to be married, living together as husband and wife within the State of Texas, and representing to others as married). The Court also invoked the harmful-error doctrine (Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik; Gunn v. McCoy) and precedent discouraging judicial figures from testimony that risks undermining public confidence or unduly swaying a jury (Joachim v. Chambers; In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg).

Application

The Court reasoned that the elements of informal marriage are not technical or specialized and therefore fall within ordinary juror competence. Judge York’s testimony repeatedly asserted the parties met the statutory elements and carried particular weight because she framed her methodology as the same she used while presiding over informal-marriage cases. That combination—an expert opinion on a purely factual/legal-status question within juror knowledge and the persuasive aura of a former judge—meant the testimony did not “help” the jury in the sense Rule 702 requires. Assessing harm, the Court reviewed the entirety of trial circumstances (voir dire through closing), concluding the testimony likely contributed substantially to the adverse judgment because it was central to the contested issue and not merely cumulative, and the former-judge’s statements risked swaying the jury and undermining impartiality.

Accordingly, the erroneous admission was harmful.

Holding

The Court held that admitting the former judge’s expert testimony on the existence of an informal marriage was an abuse of discretion because the question was within the common knowledge and experience of jurors and thus not appropriate expert testimony under TEX. R. EVID. 702. The Court further held that the error was harmful—given the role the testimony played and the witness’s judicial status—and warranted reversal and remand for a new trial. The court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded.

Practical Application

Family-law practitioners must treat claims of informal marriage as jury-resolved factual inquiries unless the proffered expert brings genuine specialized knowledge beyond what an average juror possesses.

Avoid offering experts to testify that a party “was informally married” or to articulate legal presumptions.

When opposing such testimony, emphasize Rule 702’s requirement that expert testimony be beyond a juror’s common understanding and stress the risk of undue influence when the witness is a former judge.

In contested probate heirship, divorce, or property partition matters where marital status is dispositive, litigators should prefer documentary and testimonial facts (communications, cohabitation patterns, public representations) and target strategic voir dire and jury instruction arguments rather than reliance on expert marital-status opinions.

Checklists

Preparation: Gather Your Evidence

• Compile contemporaneous documents showing cohabitation, joint accounts, tax filings, bills, mail, and correspondence reflecting shared life.
• Secure third-party witness statements about how the parties represented their relationship to the community.
• Obtain timeline evidence demonstrating the progression (agreement, cohabitation, representations) to present directly to the jury.

When Opposing Proffered Experts on Marital Status

• File a pretrial motion in limine and a Daubert-style motion to exclude under TEX. R. EVID. 702, emphasizing juror competence to assess statutory elements.
• Prepare voir dire triggers to expose non-specialized nature of the issue and to limit the expert’s influence if admitted.
• If the expert is a former judge, highlight Joachim v. Chambers and the risk of undermining judicial impartiality and undue deference.

When Offering Expert Testimony (if necessary)

• Only offer experts whose expertise is genuinely technical (e.g., forensic linguistics about representations, social-science testimony about cohabitation patterns in complex contexts) and craft narrowly tailored opinions avoiding legal conclusions.
• Draft direct examination to avoid asking the expert to state the ultimate legal conclusion (e.g., “they were married”); instead elicit specialized factual analysis and let counsel argue the legal conclusion.
• Prepare limiting instructions and consider offering stipulations to constrain jury misuse.

Preservation and Trial Craft

• Make contemporaneous objections on the record identifying Rule 702 grounds and request limiting instructions; obtain adverse rulings for appeal.
• Emphasize in closing that the jury alone must decide ultimate marital status and that expert testimony—if admitted—was offered only on limited factual questions.
• Consider retrial strategy early: if exclusion fails, plan cross-examination to neutralize aura of authority (attacking methodology, showing no specialized need).

Citation

In re Estate of Guadalupe Lopez, Sr., Deceased, No. 24-0315 (Tex. Nov. 7, 2025).

Full Opinion

Full opinion (PDF)