Section 7.006 Divorce Agreement Repudiation | Cylear v. Johnson-Cylear (2025)

Cylear v. Johnson-Cylear, 03-25-00129-CV, May 14, 2026.

On appeal from 480th District Court of Williamson County

Synopsis

A purported agreement incident to divorce to sell marital real property was not enforceable where the appellate record contained neither a signed written agreement nor a reporter’s record showing an enforceable open-court agreement. The Third Court also held that temporary orders requiring the property to be listed for sale did not amount to a Family Code section 7.006(b) finding that the agreement was “just and right,” and the parties’ later decision to try the property division as a contested issue operated as repudiation of any nonbinding agreement.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters directly to Texas divorce lawyers handling property division, mediated terms, Rule 11 agreements, and temporary-orders practice. Cylear is a useful reminder that section 7.006 is not self-executing: if you want an agreement concerning division of marital property to control the final decree, you need a provable agreement in the record, and you need to account for the statute’s repudiation language. Just as importantly, the case reinforces that temporary orders dealing with use, possession, or even listing of marital real property do not necessarily lock in the final property division, and that trying the issue on the merits can undo the premise that there was ever a binding pre-rendition deal.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Leonard Cylear and Rita Johnson-Cylear were divorcing in Williamson County. During the pendency of the case, Rita sought temporary orders concerning the marital residence on Camp Verde Drive. After a hearing, the trial court signed temporary orders directing that the marital residence be listed for sale with a named realtor and requiring both parties to execute documents necessary to place the property on the market and effectuate a sale. The court also allocated responsibility for the monthly mortgage and awarded Rita exclusive use of the residence while the case was pending.

The case did not end in settlement. Leonard later requested a jury trial, and the matter proceeded to a two-day trial in January 2025. The jury resolved a series of characterization, reimbursement, fraud, and attorney’s-fee questions. The remaining issues, including division of the community estate’s real property, were tried to the bench. In the final decree, the trial court awarded the Camp Verde Property to Rita.

On appeal, Leonard argued that the trial court should not have awarded the residence to Rita because the parties had supposedly entered into an agreement incident to divorce requiring the property to be sold. But the appellate record did not contain a signed agreement governing that disposition. Leonard relied instead on an unsigned document labeled “Rule 11 Agreement” that he filed post-judgment, along with his assertion that the parties had announced an agreement at a prior hearing. The record, however, contained no reporter’s record of that hearing. He also contended that the temporary orders and a residential listing agreement with a realtor made the supposed agreement binding. The Third Court rejected those arguments.

Issues Decided

• Whether a purported agreement incident to divorce under Texas Family Code section 7.006 to sell marital real property was enforceable when the appellate record contained no signed written agreement and no record of an enforceable open-court agreement.
• Whether temporary orders directing the parties to list the marital residence for sale constituted a section 7.006(b) finding that the agreement was “just and right” and therefore binding on the trial court at final decree.
• Whether execution of a residential real estate listing agreement rendered the alleged divorce agreement “binding under another rule of law” so as to preclude repudiation before rendition.
• Whether trying the property division as a contested issue effectively repudiated any earlier nonbinding agreement regarding the real property.

Rules Applied

The court’s analysis centered on Texas Family Code section 7.006 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

Under Family Code section 7.006, spouses may enter into a written agreement concerning division of property in anticipation of divorce. But the statute also expressly provides that such an agreement may be revised or repudiated before rendition unless it is binding under another rule of law. If the trial court finds that the terms of the written agreement are “just and right,” those terms are binding on the court. If not, the court may request revision or set the case for a contested hearing.

The court also relied on Rule 11 principles. A party seeking enforcement of an agreement in pending litigation generally must show either a writing signed and filed with the court or an agreement made in open court and entered of record. The opinion cited Clanin v. Clanin, 918 S.W.2d 673, 676–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ), for the proposition that compliance with the “open court and entered of record” component of Rule 11 can satisfy the writing requirement for section 7.006 purposes in divorce cases.

The court further reiterated the appellate preservation principle that the appellant bears the burden to present a record showing reversible error. Where the claimed agreement depends on a hearing record not brought forward, the argument predictably fails.

Application

The Third Court treated Leonard’s theory as failing at the threshold evidentiary level. He claimed there was an agreement incident to divorce requiring sale of the Camp Verde Property, yet the appellate record contained no signed agreement between the parties. The unsigned “Rule 11 Agreement” he attached after judgment was not enough. Nor could he rely on an alleged oral announcement in court because no reporter’s record of that hearing appeared in the appellate record. In other words, the court was asked to enforce an agreement that could not be proven in the record in any form recognized by section 7.006 and Rule 11.

From there, the court moved to repudiation. Even assuming an agreement once existed, section 7.006 expressly allows revision or repudiation before rendition unless the agreement is independently binding under another rule of law. The court viewed the later course of litigation as decisive: the parties proceeded to a contested trial on property-division issues, including the Camp Verde Property. That conduct was inconsistent with any insistence that the property disposition had already been fixed by binding agreement. By trying the issue, the parties effectively repudiated any earlier nonbinding arrangement.

Leonard’s reliance on the temporary orders also failed because the orders did not do what section 7.006(b) requires. They did not state that the court found the terms of a written agreement “just and right.” They simply directed listing the property for sale and execution of necessary documents. Those are case-management and interim property-preservation directives, not approval of a final contractual division of the marital estate. The court underscored the point by noting the absence of evidence that any offer had been made or that the property ever went under contract.

His final argument—that the listing agreement with the realtor made the property-sale arrangement binding under another rule of law—also did not carry the day. The listing agreement merely authorized Wolf Real Estate to market the property for a defined period. It did not transform an otherwise unproven and repudiable interspousal property-division agreement into one insulated from section 7.006(a)’s repudiation clause.

Holding

The court held that the purported agreement incident to divorce requiring sale of the Camp Verde Property was not enforceable under Texas Family Code section 7.006. The appellate record contained neither a signed written agreement nor a reporter’s record establishing an enforceable open-court Rule 11 agreement. On that record, Leonard could not show that the trial court was bound to divide the property in accordance with the alleged agreement.

The court further held that even if some agreement had once existed, section 7.006 allowed repudiation before rendition because Leonard failed to show that the agreement was binding under another rule of law. The parties’ decision to proceed to a contested hearing on the property division, including the Camp Verde Property, constituted effective repudiation of any nonbinding agreement.

The court also held that the temporary orders requiring the marital residence to be listed for sale did not constitute a section 7.006(b) finding that an agreement was “just and right,” and thus did not bind the trial court’s final division of the estate. Interim directives concerning listing and sale mechanics did not obligate the trial court to award or dispose of the property in any specific way in the final decree.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, Cylear is a record-making case as much as a property-division case. If you want to preserve a section 7.006 agreement for enforcement on appeal, do not assume everyone’s shared understanding, mediation history, or temporary-orders practice will substitute for a signed instrument or a transcribed open-court recitation. The case is a sharp reminder that appellate courts will not reconstruct a missing agreement from post-judgment attachments, informal labels, or references to hearings that are absent from the record.

The opinion also has practical significance for lawyers who use temporary orders to move real property during the pendency of divorce. Orders to list, cooperate with a realtor, maintain the property, or sign routine sales paperwork may be highly useful interim relief, but they should not be mistaken for a final adjudication under section 7.006(b). If the objective is to make the ultimate disposition binding on the court, counsel should obtain a compliant agreement and an express just-and-right finding tied to that agreement, then ensure the decree incorporates it.

Strategically, Cylear also warns against mixed signals. A party cannot easily maintain that property disposition is fixed by agreement while simultaneously trying that same issue as contested. If the deal is binding, litigate like it is binding: move to enforce, object to trial of the issue, make a clean record, and secure rulings. If instead the case is tried on the merits, the appellate court may view that conduct as repudiation.

The case also speaks to preservation and appellate posture. If your client’s section 7.006 theory depends on a prior hearing, order the reporter’s record. If it depends on a signed agreement, file it. If it depends on a just-and-right finding, get that language into a signed order or decree. The failure points in Cylear were not exotic; they were procedural and documentary, which makes the case especially relevant to everyday family-law practice.

Checklists

Preserving a Section 7.006 Agreement

• Reduce the agreement to a writing signed by both parties.
• File the signed agreement with the court.
• If proceeding by oral agreement, state the agreement in open court.
• Ensure the oral agreement is transcribed by the court reporter.
• Confirm the agreement is entered of record in a manner satisfying Rule 11.
• Tie the agreement expressly to Texas Family Code section 7.006 in the text of the agreement or record.
• Make sure the final decree either sets out the agreement in full or incorporates it by reference.

Securing a Binding “Just and Right” Finding

• Request an express finding that the terms of the written agreement are “just and right” under section 7.006(b).
• Put that finding in a signed order or the final decree itself.
• Do not rely on implied findings from temporary orders.
• Distinguish between interim sale/listing directives and approval of a final property-division agreement.
• If the court declines to approve the agreement, request a clear ruling for the record.

Avoiding Repudiation Problems

• Decide early whether the case is being resolved by agreement or tried as contested.
• If your position is that the agreement is binding, object to reopening or retrying the agreed property issues.
• Move to enforce the agreement before final trial if the opposing party backs away.
• Avoid trying the same property issue on the merits unless you are prepared for the court to treat the agreement as repudiated.
• Create a clear record if your participation in trial is subject to an enforcement objection or reservation of rights.

Using Temporary Orders Without Overreading Them

• Draft temporary orders with precision about whether they are interim only.
• Do not assume that an order to list property for sale resolves final ownership or division.
• If listing is intended to be merely provisional, say so.
• If sale is intended to be part of a final agreed division, pair the temporary order with a compliant section 7.006 agreement.
• Track whether the property actually receives an offer or goes under contract; the absence of a transaction may matter later.

Building the Appellate Record

• Order all reporter’s records for hearings involving settlement announcements or Rule 11 recitations.
• Include all signed agreements, exhibits, and referenced attachments in the clerk’s record.
• Verify that post-judgment filings are not the first appearance of the alleged agreement.
• Preserve complaints through timely objections, motions to enforce, motions to modify, or post-judgment motions as appropriate.
• Review the record before notice of appeal to confirm the agreement can actually be proven from the appellate materials.

Representing the Party Opposing Enforcement

• Test whether the alleged agreement is signed, filed, and in the record.
• Challenge any reliance on unsigned drafts, emails, or post-judgment attachments.
• Assert section 7.006(a) repudiation if rendition has not occurred and no independent basis for binding effect exists.
• Emphasize that temporary orders do not equal a section 7.006(b) just-and-right finding absent express language.
• If the issue proceeds to trial, develop the record that property division is contested.

Citation

Cylear v. Johnson-Cylear, No. 03-25-00129-CV, memorandum opinion (Tex. App.—Austin May 14, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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