Rule 24.2(a)(2) Governs Real-Property Sale Judgments | Pirogov v. Pirogov (2026)

Xenia Pirogov v. Ilya Pirogov, 04-26-00010-CV, May 27, 2026.

On appeal from 456th District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Synopsis

A divorce judgment ordering the sale of marital real property and division of the net proceeds is a judgment for recovery of an interest in real property under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(2). That means the supersedeas amount must be based on the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue, not an equity-style estimate or a discretionary amount under Rule 24.2(a)(3); setting the bond without evidence of rent or revenue is an abuse of discretion.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters immediately to Texas family-law trial and appellate practice because sale-of-residence provisions are routine in divorce decrees. When a final decree orders the marital residence sold and the proceeds divided, the supersedeas analysis is now framed as a real-property-interest case, not a catch-all “other than money or property” case. For litigators, that affects how quickly enforcement can proceed, what evidence must be developed at the Rule 24 hearing, how to resist an inflated bond request, and how to preserve possession and status quo during appeal. Although the opinion arises from a motion to review supersedeas, its practical force is broader: decrees involving forced sale, partition-like relief, reimbursement through sale proceeds, or structured percentages of net proceeds should trigger a Rule 24.2(a)(2) analysis.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

In the underlying divorce, the trial court ordered the marital home sold and allocated the proceeds by awarding Ilya Pirogov the first $6,733.27, then dividing the remaining proceeds 70% to Xenia Pirogov and 30% to Ilya. Xenia appealed and sought to supersede the judgment under Rule 24.

At the supersedeas hearing, the trial court focused on the home’s market value and the mortgage balance. The parties gave differing numbers, but the court’s stated reasoning was that if the house was worth roughly $320,000 to $330,000 and around $280,000 remained due on the loan, the amount left to divide would support setting Xenia’s supersedeas bond at $15,000. The record also reflected a post-trial finding that the mortgage balance was actually $363,537.10.

Xenia challenged that ruling in the court of appeals, arguing that because the judgment involved real property, Rule 24.2(a)(2) controlled and required the supersedeas amount to be based on the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue. The Fourth Court granted temporary relief, stayed enforcement, and then reviewed whether the trial court had used the correct subsection of Rule 24.2.

Issues Decided

• Whether a divorce decree ordering the sale of marital real property and division of the net proceeds is a judgment for recovery of an interest in real property under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(2).
• Whether the trial court erred by treating the decree as falling under Rule 24.2(a)(3), the catch-all provision for judgments other than money or an interest in property.
• Whether a supersedeas amount based on market value, mortgage balance, and estimated equity—rather than evidence of the property interest’s rent or revenue—constitutes an abuse of discretion.
• Whether remand for an evidentiary hearing was required because the record did not establish the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue.

Rules Applied

The court’s analysis turned on the structure of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24:

• Rule 24.1 identifies available methods of superseding a judgment, including bond, deposit, written agreement, and alternate security.
• Rule 24.2(a)(1) applies to money judgments.
• Rule 24.2(a)(2) applies when the judgment is for recovery of an interest in real property; the security must be at least the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue.
• Rule 24.2(a)(3) applies to judgments for something other than money or an interest in property and requires security sufficient to protect against loss or damage caused by the appeal.
• Rule 24.4 permits appellate review of supersedeas rulings.
• Rule 24.3 preserves the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction over the amount and type of security during the appeal.

The court also relied on several authorities framing the meaning of “interest in property”:

• Hibernia Energy III, LLC v. Ferae Naturae, LLC, 668 S.W.3d 771 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, order), which held that Rule 24.2(a)(2) extends beyond title or possession disputes and includes foreclosure judgments because a lienholder has a current interest in the property.
• Brady v. Compass Bank, No. 04-19-00021-CV, 2019 WL 1459257 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 3, 2019, order), recognizing a foreclosure judgment as one involving an interest in real property under Rule 24.2(a)(2).
• Haedge v. Central Texas Cattlemen’s Ass’n, 603 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. 2020), for abuse-of-discretion review with de novo review of legal determinations.
• Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC v. 1776 Energy Partners, LLC, 672 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. 2023), on supersedeas preserving the status quo pending appeal.
• El Caballero Ranch, Inc. v. Grace River Ranch, LLC, 707 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, order), distinguishing judgments that are injunctive or declaratory by nature and therefore fit Rule 24.2(a)(3).

Application

The Fourth Court approached the dispute as a classification problem under Rule 24.2. The appellee argued that subsection (a)(2) should be limited to judgments awarding title or possession of real property and that a decree ordering sale and division of proceeds was better treated under subsection (a)(3). The court rejected that narrowing construction.

Relying heavily on Hibernia, the court emphasized that Rule 24.2 uses the broader phrase “an interest in real property,” not merely land, title, or possession. That textual choice mattered. If a foreclosure judgment qualifies under subsection (a)(2) because a lien is a cognizable present interest in real property, then a divorce decree allocating parties’ rights in the marital residence and directing its sale likewise adjudicates an interest in real property. In other words, the sale mechanism does not strip the decree of its real-property character. The parties were still being awarded and divested of interests in the property itself, even though monetization would occur through a sale.

Once the court classified the decree under Rule 24.2(a)(2), the flaw in the trial court’s bond calculation became obvious. The trial judge had worked from asserted market value and debt figures to approximate divisible equity, then effectively selected a number tied to the appellee’s share. But subsection (a)(2) does not measure security by equity, expected net sale proceeds, or a generalized discretionary fairness assessment. It measures security by “the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue.” Because there was no evidentiary basis in the record for that measure, the order could not stand.

The court therefore did not itself set the new amount. Instead, it remanded for an evidentiary hearing so the trial court could determine the proper amount under the correct rule and also address the appellant’s requests for reduction to zero or nominal security and for alternate non-monetary security under Rule 24.2(b).

Holding

The court held that a divorce judgment ordering the sale of marital real property and division of the net proceeds is a judgment for recovery of an interest in real property within the meaning of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(2). The fact that the decree required a sale rather than awarding title or possession outright did not move the judgment into Rule 24.2(a)(3).

The court further held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting the supersedeas amount without applying Rule 24.2(a)(2)’s required measure—the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue. A bond based on market-value and mortgage-balance arithmetic, without evidence of rent or revenue, is legally unsupported.

Finally, the court held that remand was necessary because the appellate record did not establish the relevant rent-or-revenue value. The trial court was directed to conduct further proceedings, set appropriate security under Rule 24.2(a)(2)(A), and consider requests for reduction or alternate security under Rule 24.2(b).

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, Pirogov is a strong reminder that supersedeas in property-division appeals is often won or lost at the classification stage. If the decree orders a residence, ranch, acreage, or investment property sold and allocates the proceeds, start with Rule 24.2(a)(2), not Rule 24.2(a)(3). The practical consequence is significant: the evidentiary focus shifts away from equity, debt load, and projected net proceeds and toward rent, fair rental value, income stream, and other revenue characteristics of the property interest.

This will matter in several recurring scenarios. In a divorce involving the marital residence, the spouse trying to halt a court-ordered sale pending appeal should frame the decree as adjudicating an interest in real property and insist on evidence directed to rent or revenue. In cases involving vacation rentals, farm and ranch property, mineral-bearing acreage, or investment real estate, Pirogov gives practitioners a more precise roadmap for what proof belongs at the supersedeas hearing. And in cases where the property is non-income-producing, counsel should be prepared to address whether rental value can be proved, whether nominal or reduced security is appropriate, and whether alternate non-monetary security will adequately protect the appellee.

The opinion also has drafting implications. If you represent the prevailing party in a decree that contemplates sale of real property, do not assume the other side must post a bond tied to estimated sale equity or your client’s projected share. If you represent the appellant, do not walk into the Rule 24 hearing with only valuation evidence. Pirogov all but invites reversal where the record lacks rent-or-revenue evidence. For appellate preservation, this means objecting clearly to the use of the wrong subsection and making an affirmative record on the correct measure.

Strategically, the case gives family lawyers another reason to treat post-judgment enforcement and appellate planning as part of the merits case, not an afterthought. If the decree compels sale, possession turnover, listing compliance, or cooperation with a realtor, the window to seek temporary relief may be short. Counsel should be prepared to move quickly in both the trial court and the court of appeals.

Checklists

Classifying the Decree for Supersedeas

• Identify whether the decree orders sale, transfer, foreclosure-like relief, turnover, or partition of real property.
• Analyze whether the judgment adjudicates a present right, claim, lien, or ownership share in real property.
• Argue Rule 24.2(a)(2) if the decree affects an interest in real property, even if it does not award title or possession outright.
• Resist attempts to place a sale-of-property decree into Rule 24.2(a)(3) merely because the property will be converted to cash.
• Cite Pirogov, Hibernia Energy III, and Brady together to show that “interest in real property” is broader than title or possession.

Building the Evidentiary Record

• Present evidence of actual rent, fair market rental value, lease income, occupancy value, or other revenue attributable to the property.
• If the property is not leased, offer competent testimony or expert evidence on fair rental value.
• Distinguish rental value from market value and equity; do not assume proof of one establishes the other.
• Introduce documentary support such as leases, rental comps, property-management statements, tax records, or appraiser opinions.
• Make a clear record if the opposing party offers only value and debt evidence without rent-or-revenue proof.

Protecting the Appellant Seeking to Supersede

• File the Rule 24 motion promptly after judgment.
• Ask the trial court to apply Rule 24.2(a)(2) expressly.
• Request findings or an articulated basis for the supersedeas amount.
• If rent-or-revenue evidence is weak or the property is non-income-producing, seek reduction under Rule 24.2(b).
• Request alternate security where cash or bond would cause substantial harm or is unnecessary to protect the appellee.
• Seek emergency temporary relief in the court of appeals if enforcement is imminent.

Protecting the Prevailing Party Resisting Supersedeas

• Develop affirmative evidence of the property interest’s rent or revenue rather than relying on projected equity.
• Show how delay pending appeal could cause measurable loss tied to the property’s use, income, or carrying costs.
• Oppose nominal security with record evidence demonstrating concrete risk of loss.
• If alternate security is proposed, test whether it truly preserves the status quo and protects against appeal-related damage.
• Ask the trial court to enter a detailed order identifying the rule applied and the evidence supporting the amount.

Avoiding the Trial-Court Error Seen in Pirogov

• Do not calculate a Rule 24.2(a)(2) bond from market value minus mortgage debt.
• Do not assume the appellee’s percentage of projected sale proceeds equals the proper supersedeas amount.
• Do not use Rule 24.2(a)(3) as a fallback without first deciding whether the decree adjudicates an interest in real property.
• Do not proceed without an evidentiary basis for rent or revenue.
• Do not overlook the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction under Rule 24.3 to modify security if circumstances change.

Citation

Pirogov v. Pirogov, No. 04-26-00010-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 27, 2026, mem. op. on motion to review supersedeas bond).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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